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Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)
Abstract

The intelligence community and the law enforcement sector are supposed to be working closely to keep us all
safe from terrorists and other dangers. The benefits of this cooperation should not be frittered away by
unnecessary burdens in trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts. If the executive branch is to be kept away
from the dark side of counterterrorism, the courts, Congress, or a combination of the two should modernize
their approach to alignment, to Section 6 of Classified Information Procedures Act, and to closed portions of
trials.
First, a prosecutor’s discovery obligations should apply to the intelligence community only when spymasters
have most actively participated in the investigation. When defining “most actively” and in determining who
falls within the prosecution unit, all three branches of government should err toward non-alignment. The
recent creep toward conceding alignment on all cases since 9/11 should stop.
Second, courts should be less inclined to admit top-secret information into trial than information at a lower
level of classification. The more sensitive the information, the more leeway courts should give prosecutors in
proposing substitutions and summaries. The common sense that probably fills the gaps of CIPA practice,
squeezing around cases and the statute, should be formalized by an update of CIPA.
Third, it should be possible to close portions of trials to all but the judge, jury, and the parties to the case when
especially sensitive information is being presented. These limited closures will allow courts, as a compensating
benefit, to lean toward defendants on Section 6 decisions as to the use of classified information at trial. By this
compensation, the either/or of full disclosure versus complete suppression is traded for a range of options.
CIPA is showing its age. Even so, because its foundation is solid, it does not require a tear down as much as a
remodeling. In at least three areas – alignment, Section 6, and closed portions of trials – our nation deserves a
better resolution between the conflicting interests of prosecutors and spymasters.
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REMODELING THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA)
Afsheen John Radsan*

INTRODUCTION

A.

The Tensions Between Intelligence
and Law Enforcement

Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) is the highest-level member of
al Qaeda captured since 9/11.1 On November 14, 2009, six years after
KSM's capture in Pakistan, Attorney General Eric Holder designated
KSM, along with four other suspected terrorists, for trial in the Southern
District of New York. 2 The consequences of Holder's attempt at
transparent justice are not yet clear.
If a high-level terrorist eventually pleads guilty or is convicted in
civilian court, the Obama Administration will use that result to justify
handling other suspected terrorists the same way. That justification
would be unfortunate because guilty verdicts, if they do occur in
civilian court for members of al Qaeda, will be strokes of luck rather
than the benefit of sound strategy. From arraignment to jury trial to
sentencing, handling high-level terrorists in civilian court presents
profound problems. The transparency of civilian justice cannot always
be reconciled with the secrecy of intelligence activities.
How much access will terrorists and their defense lawyers be given
to CIA records and to other files within the American intelligence
community? What classified information will be put on the public
record? To what extent will witnesses discuss the circumstances of
KSM's capture, detention, and interrogation? Will any CIA employees
* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law (john.radsan@wmitchell.edu). Professor
Radsan is a former federal prosecutor and a former CIA lawyer. He thanks Benjamin Canine,
Brian Carter, Sarah McBroom and Michael Weinbeck for research assistance.

1 See

Erik Eckholm, PakistanisArrest Qaeda Figure Seen as Plannerof 9/11, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 2, 2003, at Al (describing KSM's capture and suggesting he "may be the most important
and is certainly the most feared" of the al Qaeda agents captured since 9/11).
2 Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New York,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al (describing Holder's decision to prosecute KSM in federal
court).
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take the stand? The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),
which regulates the disclosure and use of classified information in
federal criminal cases, purports to answer these questions for civilian
court. 3 But CIPA, under current practices, is not up to the task. For this
reason, I argue that if suspected terrorists are to be tried in federal court,
the CIPA statute and other trial practices must be updated to sustain and
to encourage greater collaboration between American intelligence
agencies and law enforcement.
KSM, no matter one's perspective, is a tough case for American
justice. Snatched from his sleep in Pakistan in 2003, KSM was
transferred with the help of foreign security services to various secret
sites for enhanced interrogations outside the United States. CIA
interrogators used the "waterboard"-a sort of simulated drowning-on
him 183 times.4 By 2006, as a result of President Bush's lobbying for
the Military Commissions Act, KSM was transferred to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. There, the Bush Administration tried to deal with him by
military commission. But the Administration did not complete the
process before President Obama took office in 2009.
If my predictions are correct, handling al Qaeda members in
civilian court will come at great cost to intelligence sources and
methods. These cases highlight the urgency of adjusting CIPA to
handle secrets in public trials. If I am incorrect (and if a high-level
terrorism case in civilian court is not a disaster for the intelligence
community), then the Obama Administration will have no principled
excuse for trying any suspected terrorists by alternative adjudication.
CIPA is not only about terrorists. Before 9/11, the most prominent
cases under CIPA involved double agents; Ames,5 Hanssen, 6
Nicholson, 7 and other traitors come to mind. Even so, classified
information has also affected narcotics, fraud, and bribery cases.
Regardless of whether the prosecution is for espionage or terrorism, the
complications that stem from handling classified information in civilian
court sometimes cause the prosecutor to drop the criminal charges. 8
3 Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
4 See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2009, at Al.
5 See generally PETE EARLEY, CONFESSIONS OF A Spy: THE REAL STORY OF ALDRICH
AMES (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1997). Aldrich Ames was convicted of spying in 1994 after he
admitted to providing the KGB with CIA intelligence in return for over four million dollars. Id.
6 See generally ADRIAN HAVILL, THE SPY WHO STAYED OUT IN THE COLD: THE SECRET
LIFE OF FBI DOUBLE AGENT ROBERT HANSSEN (2001). In 2001, Robert Hanssen pleaded guilty
to twenty counts of espionage after fifteen years of disclosing sensitive information to the Soviets
and Russians. Id.
7 See generally Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Officer Admits Spying for Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1997, at A14. Harold Nicholson, the highest ranking CIA officer ever charged with espionage,
spied for the Russians from 1994 to 1997. Id.
8 The Iran-Contra prosecution of Joseph Fernandez, a CIA chief in Costa Rica, is one
example. United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990). CIPA forced the trial court
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Other times, the complications are resolved and a conviction obtained. 9
(And sometimes, after hearing from the intelligence community in
private, federal prosecutors decide not to bring criminal charges at all.)
Overall, whether and how the complications are resolved depends on
the case and the sensitivity of the information to be disclosed. For
terrorism and other cases, CIPA is a place where the secrecy necessary
to protect sources and methods collides with the transparency at the core
of American justice.
The prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui is another example of a
terrorism case that relied on CIPA-style procedures to balance the
values of secrecy and transparency.' 0 Arrested before 9/11, but
sentenced after 9/11, Moussaoui straddled two eras in American
counterterrorism. Nearly five years after his indictment in 2001, after
many tense exchanges between prosecutors and the intelligence
community, and after appeals between the district court and the Fourth
Circuit, one holdout juror spared Moussaoui's life.II Moussaoui, no
longer the center of a media circus, spends the rest of his life in a
supermax facility in Florence, Colorado. In the aftermath, scholars
debate whether United States v. Moussaoui shows that criminal justice
to dismiss charges against Fernandez because the intelligence community would not reveal
classified information the court determined was necessary to Fernandez's defense. Id.
9 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Guilty on 4 of 5 Counts; Former
Cheney Aide Convicted of Lying About His Role in Leak, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al.

Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald cleared CIPA hurdles and obtained convictions against "Scooter"
Libby for obstructing justice and making false statements in an investigation related to the
"outing" of CIA analyst Valerie Plame. Id.
10 United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd in part on reh'g,
382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). Moussaoui, for a while believed
to be the "twentieth hijacker," was arrested before the 9/11 attacks and then charged in civilian
court with conspiracy to commit international terrorism and other crimes related to 9/11.
Moussaoui claimed he was not involved in 9/11 and did not know about the attacks, Id. at 484
n. 11. He did admit, however, that he was prepared for follow-up attacks. Other high-level al
Qaeda detainees, during interrogations at CIA black sites, made exculpatory comments that
supported Moussaoui's claim that he knew nothing of 9/11. 382 F.3d at 473-74. The government
provided classified discovery to Moussaoui's lawyers, who had security clearances, but not to
Moussaoui himself. Upon the defense's request, the trial court ordered the government to give
Moussaoui access to the high-level detainees via a video feed in a remote location. The
government refused, preferring instead to take its CIPA lumps. In an expected move, the trial
court eliminated the death penalty as a possible sentence in the case. The government, not
satisfied with the prospect of a life sentence for Moussaoui, filed an interlocutory appeal under
CIPA § 7. The Fourth Circuit, more receptive than the trial court to the government's national
security arguments, ruled that written statements based on responses to interrogators from the
intelligence community were adequate substitutes for detainee depositions that would have
included the parties. For this reason, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
manage those substitutions. Id. at 477-80. Moussaoui appealed, and the Supreme Court denied
his petition for review. Back in district court, Moussaoui-in a surprise to all-pleaded guilty, an
act that obviated any separate CIPA issues for the guilt phase of the case. United States v.
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2010).

11 Timothy Dwyer, One Juror Between TerroristAnd Death; Moussaoui Foreman Recalls
Frustration,WASH. POST, May 12, 2006, at Al.
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can handle terrorism trials or whether the "mess from Minnesota"
underscores the need for alternative adjudication. 12 No matter one's
opinion on the specifics of Moussaoui, that case illustrates the
challenges for spymasters and prosecutors in handling terrorism in
civilian courts. As to other members of al Qaeda in American custody,
the suspects' rights to due process often conflict with what is necessary
to protect national security.
Even in the struggle against international terrorists, sharing
information has not always been easy for the intelligence and law
enforcement sectors. This difficulty stems, in part, from distinct
institutional cultures. CIA officers and FBI agents, with different
missions and separate training, see the world through distinct lenses.
The CIA gathers intelligence for policymakers under a cloak of secrecy,
while the FBI gathers evidence likely to see daylight in a public trial.
The CIA operates mainly overseas while the FBI operates mainly in the
United States. For the nation's security from foreign and domestic foes,
the CIA and the FBI have improved and should continue to improve
their cooperation. 13 But if CIPA does not provide realistic protection of
intelligence sources and methods, public terrorism trials during the
Obama era will impede cooperation between the CIA and the FBI.
Much has been done to facilitate cooperation between the CIA and
the FBI since 9/11. Congress passed the PATRIOT Act that, among
many other things, allowed grand jury information to be shared with the
intelligence community. 14 And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review, through a rare opinion from the special appellate
12 For commentary that Moussaoui was wrongly decided, see Brian McEvoy, Classified
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a Misapplication of the Classified
Information ProceduresAct, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 395, 423 (2005) (characterizing Moussaoui as a
"failure" and "dangerous precedent"); A. John Radsan, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from
Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1417, 1420, 1453 (2005) (characterizing the Moussaoui
trial as a "circus" and "a sad relic of the past, a modem version of Bleak House"); Carl Tobias,
Punishment and the War on Terrorism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116, 1125 (2004) (arguing that the
Moussaoui prosecution in federal court realized little success); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 573, 599 (2006) (using Moussaoui as an example ofjudicial activity in national
security being slow in implementation and self-correction).
13 Cf NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 417 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. According to the 9/11
Commission Report:
Each intelligence agency has its own security practices, outgrowths of the Cold

War....
But the security concerns need to be weighed against the costs. Current security
requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentation of information
among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks
(criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing
information.
Id.

14 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
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court, lowered the wall that stood in the way of exchanging personnel
and information between intelligence and law enforcement.' 5 That
lowering of the wall makes CIPA increasingly important for terrorism
cases in civilian court; the FBI and the Justice Department cannot
pretend that the law seals off the intelligence community from their
criminal investigations. Yet Congress and the appellate courts have
largely ignored CIPA since 9/11.16 While more classified information
is subject to discovery and use at trial, the scholarship about CIPA lags
behind.
B.

CIPA Is Not Magic

The Bush Administration emphasized prevention over prosecution
of terrorism cases. As counterterrorism went to the dark side, they kept
regular courts away from the action. They opted for extraordinary
renditions, black sites, enhanced interrogations, and military
Those who once criticized Bush-particularly
commissions.
Democrats-now encourage the Obama Administration to return
terrorism cases to criminal justice.' 7 For them, KSM's designation for
trial in federal district court was a step in the right direction, a clear
statement for the rule of law. These critics should recognize, however,
that the executive's tendency to classify too much information is not the
source of all problems in handling terrorism in civilian court. And they
should take as given that cooperation between intelligence and law
enforcement plays a critical role in keeping the nation safe.' 8
On behalf of Human Rights First, two former federal prosecutors
prepared a long report concluding that criminal justice can handle
terrorism cases.19 But their study, no matter how much they posture for
civil libertarians, is of limited value in figuring out what to do with
KSM and other suspected high-level terrorists. First, as to the period
after 9/11, their study examined only minor cases of material support to
15 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
16 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-6 (2006) (corresponds to Classified Information Procedures Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-456, §§ 1-6, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)).
17 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Reno Joins Criticism of Anti-Terror Strategy; Former Prosecutors
Urge Court to Act Against Indefinite Detention of Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2006, at A6
(describing a brief filed by former Attorney General Janet Reno and seven other former Justice
Department officials criticizing the Bush Administration for trying terrorism suspects outside the
criminal justice system).
18 Cf THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 417 (recommending that intelligence
"[information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance
between security and shared knowledge" (emphasis added)).
19 RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at

http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
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terrorism. The Bush Administration, in part to avoid problems under
CIPA, turned away from the federal courts and dealt with high-level
cases through alternative means. Second, in a significant error, the two
authors failed to interview intelligence officers to learn the true costs of
public trials to sources and methods. Accordingly, their study does not
address what is necessary to surmount the obstacles that compelled the
Bush Administration to move away from civilian courts after 9/11. For
the two former prosecutors, CIPA is a wand to wave at all problems of
mixing classified information with public trials. But CIPA, as shown
below, is not really a magic wand.
For the reality of a new century, American justice must reconcile
secrecy and due process. The Obama Administration, beyond the
simple rhetoric of hope and change, must deal with the complexities of
terrorism cases. KSM is just one of their challenges. Going beyond
KSM's case, this Article asks and answers three generic questions.
First, to what extent should "alignment" cause intelligence agencies to
fall within a prosecutor's duty to search for discoverable information in
terrorism cases? In the last century, a CIA lawyer named Jonathan
Fredman provided one answer. 20 Here, in light of 9/11, I draw on my
own experiences in the CIA and the Justice Department to place
reasonable limits on alignment. Second, should a court consider the
sensitivity of information in deciding whether (and in what form) a
defendant can use it at trial? The answer to this question has resulted in
a split among federal circuits. After reviewing the details of the split, I
suggest that Congress should impose uniformity on CIPA practice by
amending § 6 of CIPA to make explicit an affirmative answer to this
question. Third, to protect classified information further, should
Congress allow portions of a trial to be closed to all but the judge, jury
and the parties rather than rely on substitutions and summaries of
sensitive information? My answer, as explained below, is yes.
CIPA, designed many years ago for espionage cases, has become
archaic. As soon as possible, CIPA should be amended to deal more
effectively with terrorism cases. Unlike defendants in espionage cases,
the defendants in terrorism cases never had access to top-secret
information. Take Moussaoui and KSM as basic examples. The
potential benefits of increased cooperation between intelligence and law
enforcement should not be squandered through antiquated notions of
what information must be turned over to these defendants and the
courts.
CIPA and related practices have tilted too much in favor of
defendants since the statute was enacted. Besides amending CIPA to
tilt it back toward the intelligence community, Congress should
20 Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team,
16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331 (1998).
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empower trial courts to expand their use of "silent witnesses" and to
adopt other practices to protect classified information. Under an
amended version of CIPA and with new practices, intelligence officers
can be protected by closed portions of a trial, a vetting of the jury
venire, silent witness practice, disguises and pseudonyms, and many
other techniques. Any tilt toward the intelligence community, to be
sure, does affect the criminal defendant's right to obtain discovery and
to present full evidence at a public trial. Yet, if CIPA functions well,
every once in a while national security must prevail over a defendant's
rights.
In answering the three questions, I try to be open about my
firsthand experience with CIPA-and about my biases. During my
tenure at the CIA, while I held a top-secret clearance, I represented the
Agency's interests on several cases involving classified information in
the courts. Now that I am independent of the CIA, this academic
commentary takes that representation to another level. To help answer
the questions about alignment, substitutions, and closed trials, I provide
background in the following section on the prosecutor's duty to disclose
and on CIPA's mechanics. Next, I answer the three questions one at a
time.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose

A federal prosecutor has constitutional and statutory duties to
disclose information to defendants. The overall duty is binary: Either
information needs to be turned over or not. This duty stems from four
sources: Brady v. Maryland; Giglio v. United States; Rule 16 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and the Jencks Act. These cases
and rules, like CIPA, were on the books before a new consensus
emerged that American prosecutors and spymasters should cooperate
more against international terrorism. The rules-at least in their current
form--do not contain any exceptions for classified information. CIPA,
by the same token, only goes so far in resolving the problems of
including the intelligence community in the prosecutor's duty to
disclose information to criminal defendants. Congress, after all, did not
purport to change the rules of evidence in cases involving classified
information. 21

21 S. REP. No. 96-823, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4295 [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
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Brady v. Maryland22 sets forth the constitutional basis for the
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory information. In Brady, the
defendant admitted to participating in the charged crime but claimed his
accomplice did the actual killing. 23 Before trial, the defense asked the
prosecution to disclose the accomplice's extrajudicial statements. 24
Although the prosecutor disclosed some statements, he withheld the
accomplice's confession to the killing. 25 This failure to disclose, the
court ruled, violated the defendant's due process. 26
Giglio v. United StateS27 expanded Brady by making documents
within the prosecutor's entire office, even those concerning an unrelated
case, subject to discovery. 28 In Giglio, the government failed to
disclose a promise of immunity to its key witness because the
prosecutor working the case was unaware of this promise. 29 On review,
the Court held that the government still had a duty to disclose this
information because it was within the other prosecutor's scope of
authority and was therefore attributable to the government. 30 In the end,
the prosecutor's office is a team, not a collection of separate players. 3 1
Based on the Court's refusal to limit a prosecutor's inquiry to only
those facts the prosecutor himself knows, an important question is how
far the inquiry extends in terrorism cases. It may be appropriate to
impute information in an FBI file to the prosecutor when investigators
and prosecutors have established a close working relationship. But
should information at the CIA or the National Security Agency always
be imputed to a federal prosecutor? The intelligence function differs
from the criminal justice function, and the prosecutor, working from a
22 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
23 Id. at 84.
24 Id.
25 Id.

26 Id. at 86. The Supreme Court later clarified its holding in Brady. To amount to a
constitutional violation, the failure to disclose must deprive the defendant of a fair trial; a
conviction will only be overturned if the failure undermines confidence in the trial's outcome.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
109-10 (1976) ("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the
constitutional sense.").
27 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
28 Id. at 154; see also Fredman, supra note 20, at 349.
29 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 152-53.

30 See id. at 154 ("A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to
the Government."); see also United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 567-70 (5th Cir. 1979). Whether an investigating agent is
considered a member of the "prosecution team" is analyzed on a case-by-case basis. R. Michael
Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied

Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1129, 1150 n. 112 (2004) (citing Meros, 866 F.2d at 1309).
31 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; see Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal
Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 401, § 2(a)

(1999).

2010]

REMODELING CIPA

445

different site, might not be able to make it past the security checkpoints
at the CIA or NSA. In short, both Brady and Giglio leave undefined the
outer limits of a prosecutor's duty. 32 This imprecision creates many
complications for terrorism cases in civilian court.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which defines
the mutual obligations of the defendant and the government, adds to the
ambiguity. In practice, most of the information regulated by Rule 16
flows from the government to the defendant. The government must
provide defendants with: (1) their prior oral statements; (2) written
statements made by the defendant that are within the government's
possession, custody, or control; (3) written records containing the
substance of statements made by the defendant; and (4) the defendant's
testimony before a grand jury. 33 The government must do all this
before trial. Therefore, Rule 16 does not allow the intelligence
community to hold on to files until and unless they are needed at trial.
Since Rule 16's plain language uses the term "government" rather than
"prosecutor," a significant CIPA issue is whether the discovery
obligations extend to the intelligence community. In many cases, the
relevant unit of "government" is tied to a core of prosecutors and
investigators. Nonetheless, the Rule does not address the specifics of
alignment: Does the prosecutor in the Southern District of New York,
for example, need to produce defendant statements that NSA
intercepted in a completely unrelated operation? 34
The Jencks Act, meanwhile, is the exclusive means by which a
defendant may request prior statements of government witnesses. It
suffers from a defect similar to Rule 16, however. It imposes discovery
obligations on the "United States" generally, not tethered to any one
governmental entity.35 The Act requires information to be turned over
to the defendant if: (1) there has been a witness statement; (2) the
United States possesses the statement; and (3) the statement relates to
the witness's testimony at trial. 36 Given that intelligence officers and
32 See infra Part III.

33 FED. R. CRM. P. 16(a)(1).
34 Rule 16 contains a carve-out akin to an attorney work-product protection for internal
documents related to the government's investigation of the case. Id. 16(a)(2). The rule also
subjects discovery of government witnesses to the Jencks Act. Id. Neither exception addresses
the issue of alignment.
35 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1969); see
also Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 103 (1976). The Jencks Act was Congress's
response to Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In Jencks, the Court held that Jencks
was entitled to inspect reports that related to the trial testimony of two government witnesses. Id.
at 668-69. Justice Clark, in dissent, said the Court's new rule was "foreign to [the United States']
federal jurisprudence"; intelligence agencies that assist on law enforcement "may as well close up
shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday
for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national secrets." Id. at 680-82
(Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark thus foresaw the CIPA problem of alignment.
36 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).
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their human sources work for the United States government, the
statute's loose language could be read to impose an obligation on the
"United States" to disclose even the identities of CIA human sources
with the most tangential connections to criminal cases.
Together, Brady, Giglio, Rule 16, and the Jencks Act place a
burden and a responsibility on the prosecutor that may reach into
several agencies at once. For the espionage and terrorism prosecutor,
discovery creates more than the usual headaches. The prosecutor is
probably more comfortable with searches in the Justice Department,
which, technically speaking, includes colleagues in the FBI. The
searches become more complicated in the intelligence community
because much, if not all, of the discoverable material will be classified.
There the prosecutor confronts a culture of pervasive secrecy.
Classification makes it even more difficult for the prosecutor to
oversee the search. At a minimum, all prosecutors and investigators on
the case will need security clearances. For the prosecutors to be able to
review everything, those top-secret clearances will need to be passed
from security officers at the Justice Department to security officers at
the intelligence agency. Once a prosecutor and an intelligence agency
become aligned on a terrorism case, discovery can be a nightmare for
both.
B.

A Response to Espionage Cases

The drafting of CIPA was influenced by the concept of
"graymail." 37 Graymail occurs when a defendant possesses classified
information and threatens to reveal this information if he is brought to
trial. Thus, in deciding whether to prosecute a traitor, the government is
frequently in a bind: A public trial could lead to the disclosure of the
very secrets that required protection in the first place. 38 This creates the
"disclose-or-dismiss" dilemma. 39 If the cost of prosecution would
outweigh the potential benefit of a guilty verdict, an intelligence agency
may advise the prosecutor to dismiss the case before it goes to trial. In
the words of Philip B. Heymann, a Harvard professor who served at
senior levels in the Justice Department, the government's problems
would then go "beyond the failure to redress particular instances of
illegal conduct." 40 As Heymann notes, foregoing prosecution "foster[s]
37 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4295.

38 Id
39 See id. at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4297.
40 Graymail Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 4736 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) [hereinafter Graymail

Hearings] (statement of Philip B. Heymann).
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the perception that government officials and private persons with access
to military or technological secrets have a broad de facto immunity from
prosecution for a variety of crimes." 4 1 And the perception that spies are
beyond the law undermines confidence in the criminal justice system.
A defendant's motives for graymail are not always the same:
Sometimes graymail is actively employed by an unscrupulous
defendant who threatens to publicly reveal all kinds of sensitive
information, even if it has no possible bearing on the issues of the
case . . . . At other times the defendant seeks only to exercise his

right to present to the jury admissible evidence that is relevant to a
legitimate defense theory and which consists of classified
information. 42
Regardless of the defendant's motives, sometimes secrets are
compromised for a wrongdoer to be punished. That is accepted. To
enforce laws designed to protect national security, however, the
government should not have to suffer too much harm. 43 A balance is
necessary for this range of cases from espionage to terrorism.
To reduce graymail's efficacy, Congress enacted CIPA in 1980.44
In the codebooks, CIPA takes no more than ten pages. CIPA was
designed for espionage cases, not terrorism cases. CIPA, however, does
not prevent the discovery or use of classified information in criminal
cases. 45 Rather, it is a procedural statute that allows the government,
before the court impanels a jury, to make an informed decision about
the effects a particular prosecution will have on national security. 46
Before CIPA, a prosecutor could only guess what classified information
the accused spy might seek to disclose, whether the court would
ultimately rule it admissible, and whether it would be leaked-all before
admissibility was determined during the course of a public trial. 47
41

Id.

42 Id. at 1 (testimony of Hon. Morgan Murphy); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at

3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4296-97 ("It would be a mistake, however, to view the
'graymail' problem as limited to instances of unscrupulous or questionable conduct by defendants
since wholly proper defense attempts to obtain or disclose classified information may present the
government with the same 'disclose or dismiss' dilemma.").
43 SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4295 ("The

government often must choose between disclosing classified information in the prosecution or
letting the conduct go unpunished. In the words of one Justice Department Officials [sic] who
testified before the subcommittee, 'To what extent must we harm the national security in order to
protect the national security?"').
44 Timothy J. Shea, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of Classified Information in
Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 657, 661 (1990).

45 United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Moussaoui, 65 F. App'x 881, 887 (4th Cir. 2003) ("CIPA alone cannot justify the sealing of oral
argument and pleadings."); United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("[CIPA] creates no new rights of or limits on discovery. . . .").
46 SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4294-95.
47 Id. at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4297; see also Richard P. Salgado, Government
Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 431-32
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Sometimes, despite the prosecutor's best guesses, trials were delayed in
midstream while complications were sorted out outside the jury's
presence. CIPA changed all that by requiring defendants to notify the
government of any classified information the defendant "reasonably
expects to disclose ... in any manner in connection with any trial or
pretrial proceeding." 4 8
The statute, nonetheless, is silent on the precise contours of the
defendant's notice under § 5.49 Defendants are not required to explain
the relevance of particular documents,50 but the notice must be
sufficiently detailed so the government can determine the extent to
which the use of the evidence at trial might threaten national security.51
A defendant's failure to comply with § 5 may preclude the use of the
non-described classified information at trial and may prohibit the
defendant's examination of any witness about that information. 52
The government may move, at any time, for a protective order
under § 3 of CIPA. Section 3 allows the court to "issue an order to
protect against the disclosure of any classified information disclosed by
the United States to any defendant in any criminal case in a district
court of the United States." 53 If the government makes a specific
showing of harm to national security, 54 the court is likely to grant a
protective order, triggering other conditions on the disclosure and use of
classified information.55 Protective orders are quite common in
terrorism cases.
(1988). Congress also acknowledged that the government may need to disclose secrets in its case
in chief, increasing the chance the defendant may need classified information. Cf SENATE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4297 ("The situation is further
complicated in cases where the government expects to disclose some classified items in
presenting its case.").
48 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §5 (2006).
49 Id. ("Such notice shall include a brief description of the classified information [the
defendant reasonably expects to disclose at any trial or pretrial proceeding].").
50 Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the ClassifiedInformation ProceduresAct
in Criminal Cases: A Primerfor Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191, 201-03 (1994).

51 United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 855 (9th Cir. 1989), amended on other grounds,
902 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1990); see, e.g., United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987)
(concluding defendants' listing of hundreds of documents they proposed to introduce, rather than
parts thereof, was not fatally defective; any error was cured by the detailed manner in which the
district court conducted hearings to determine use, relevance, or admissibility of that
information).
52 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5.
53 Id. § 3; see, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, No. 88-0080, 1988 WL 148597 (D.D.C. Apr.
15, 1988) (providing an example of a protective order entered in an Iran-Contra case).
54 See United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 716-17 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing PressEnter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391-92
(4th Cir. 1986)).
55 Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 50, at 197; see, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 727 F.
Supp. 1470, 1472, 1486 (D.D.C. 1989) (approving a procedure in which the defendant identified
documents he wanted to share with witnesses for use at trial, an interagency group of government
security officers performed a full classification review of those documents, but the group did not
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Under § 6, the government may also request a pretrial hearing to
"make all determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility
of classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial
or pretrial proceeding." 56 Both parties may be present, but the hearing
is held in camera if the Attorney General certifies, as often occurs, that
a public proceeding may result in the disclosure of classified
information.57 In Moussaoui, for example, the § 6 hearings were
closed, and the defense lawyers with security clearances participated
while Moussaoui was excluded.
Despite all the changes CIPA brought about for classified
information involved in trials, Congress did not tinker with the rules of
The Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized that a
evidence.
"defendant should not be denied the use of information that he would
otherwise use simply because of the procedures of [CIPA]." 58 The
standard for admissibility was to remain the same, "regardless of the
sensitivity of the information." 59
Now, a particular concern in terrorism cases is that a defendant
who did not previously possess classified information might acquire it
through discovery. 60 The prosecution, on its own, may provide the
defendant with discovery, or the prosecution may provide discovery
after the court has conducted an in camera, ex parte review of the
arguably discoverable information. 61 However the discovery is
provided, the government may ask the court under § 4 to permit
substitutions, admissions, or summaries of the classified information. 62
Prosecutors use their discretion on close calls. It is their reputationsand their licenses-that are on the line. Whether intelligence agencies
approve or not, some prosecutors are lenient with discovery under § 4.
They try to convince intelligence agencies that the court will later
reward this leniency by limiting the use of the information under § 6 at
disclose to the prosecutors which documents were reviewed). One certain condition in the
protective order is for the defense to review and discuss classified information at a guarded
"Secure Compartmented Information Facility" (SCIF) maintained by the Department of Justice.
Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 50, at 197.
56 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a).
57 Id.; see also id § 6(c)(1) ("The court shall hold a hearing on any motion under this section.
Any such hearing shall be held in camera at the request of the Attorney General.").
58 SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4301.
59 Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 96-1436, at 12 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980
4307, 4310 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] ("[T]he conferees agree
U.S.C.C.A.N.
that ... nothing . . .is intended to change the existing standards for determining relevance and
admissibility.").
60 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 ("The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United
States to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to
the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
61 The standard for determining if classified information is relevant and thus discoverable
depends on jurisdiction. See infra note 182.
62 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1).
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trial. Other prosecutors, seeking to limit expectations from the
beginning, are restrictive under § 4. A prosecutor does not have a
choice, of course, when an "insider" defendant (say, a former American
government official) already possesses the classified information. But
these choices do apply to "outsider" cases, including suspected
terrorists.
A common method of substitution is to redact classified
information from a document.63 Further, the government may propose
to lift unclassified portions onto a new document for the defendant's use
in discovery-or at trial. Whatever the form of substitution, the court
will grant the government's motion for substitution at trial as long as the
defendant has "substantially the same ability" to make a defense as was
provided by the classified information described in the defendant's
notice.64
If the court rejects the government's proposal for substitution
under § 6(c) and the Attorney General files an affidavit objecting to
disclosure, the court must order the defendant (who already possesses
the classified information on his own or through discovery) not to
disclose it.65 CIPA, respecting separation of powers, recognizes that the
judiciary cannot impose declassification and disclosure on the
executive. The executive's refusal to disclose does, however, carry
consequences. The court will dismiss the charges unless it determines
that the interests of justice demand a lesser sanction such as the
dismissal of specified counts of the indictment, a finding against the

63 Upon a sufficient showing, the United States may "delete specified items of classified
information from documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such
classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified
information would tend to prove." 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4.
64 Id.; see also United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (1 tth Cir. 1985) ("Such a motion
should be granted if the alternative 'will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability
to make his defense."'); see, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(permitting bare statements of fact in lieu of classified documents in prosecution for aircraft
piracy); United States v. Libby, 467 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding government's
proposed substitutions were sufficient to provide defendant, a former government official charged
with providing false statements to the FBI and false testimony to grand jury investigating leak of
a covert CIA analyst's identity, with substantially the same ability to make his defense). In
United States v. Clegg, the Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion to substitute because
the proposed substitution would decrease the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the
government approved his activities in exporting firearms. 846 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988).
65 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(1); Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 50, at 207 n.74 ("CIPA does not
comprehend judicial re-examination of the status of classified information, or review of the
Attorney General's decision to block disclosure. The legislative history recognizes that
'classification is an executive, not a judicial function.' (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at
10-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4304)).
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United States on any issue to which the excluded classified information
relates, or the preclusion of all or part of a witness's testimony. 66
If the government loses a § 6 battle on substitutions or sanctions,
§ 7 allows for interlocutory appeal. 67 The appellate court assesses the
trial court's ruling and examines the underlying relevance of the
classified information under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 68 CIPA
requires the appellate court to work on an expedited basis. 69 This may
be difficult, especially in circuits with limited CIPA practice, when
judicial clerks must obtain security clearances and courts must find
No matter the
secure facilities for the classified information.
difficulties, an appeal under CIPA can go all the way to the Supreme
Court. Even so, the Supreme Court has not involved itself in CIPA
disputes, and this level of appellate review is more important in theory
than in practice.
In sum, CIPA provides only a partial solution to the dilemma
created "when a defendant claims that he must use classified
information in defending himself." 70 It enables the government to make
an earlier, more informed decision on disclosing or dismissing, but the
government still has to make a decision. 71 CIPA may help solve the
dilemma if a court allows substitutions or summaries instead of
disclosure. But if a court rejects the government's substitution or if an
approved substitution does not do enough to protect sensitive
information, the government must decide between prosecuting with
some disclosure and dismissing the case to avoid any more disclosure.
CIPA, as noted, is aimed at those defendants who were once
entrusted with secrets and later faced prosecution for abusing that trust.

Examples include United States v. North,72 United States v.
75
Poindexter,73 United States v. Smith, 74 United States v. Fernandez,

66 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2)(A)-(C). CIPA states other sanctions may be used besides the
three it enumerates. Id. § 6(e)(2).
67 Id. §§ 6(e)(2), 7.
68 United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221,
1224 (9th Cir. 1988)).
69 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7(b).
70 Graymail Hearings, supra note 40, at 1 (testimony of Hon. Morgan Murphy).
71 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4294. The

Senate described CIPA's purpose as "provid[ing] pretrial procedures that will permit the trial
judge to rule on questions of admissibility involving classified information before introduction of
evidence in open court. This procedure will permit the government to ascertain the potential
damage to national security of proceeding with a given prosecution before trial." Id.
72 708 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1988).
73 725 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1989).
74 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
75 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990).
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and, more recently, United States v. Libby. 76

[Vol. 32:2
But defendants in

terrorism cases are not likely to know state secrets. If secrets are
revealed to suspected terrorists in discovery or at trial, these secrets will
inevitably make their way to other terrorists. Protective orders or other
instructions from the court will not take care of all problems. A
defendant who plotted to fly airplanes into buildings is not easily
deterred.
As courts handle more cases that involve classified information,
they must do their best to ensure that the costs of revealing secrets are
minimized. If the courts do not strike an appropriate balance, the
intelligence community will be right to say that the government should
handle terrorists outside the civilian courts. The more the government
prosecutes terrorism in the federal courts, the more its intelligence
sources and methods may be exposed. That potential, as CIPA is
applied today, increases with deeper cooperation between agencies.
II.

ALIGNMENTS BETWEEN PROSECUTORS AND SPYMASTERS

While CIPA explains what to do when classified information is "at
issue" in a case, it does not establish when intelligence agencies have
worked closely enough with prosecutors for discovery obligations to
extend beyond the Justice Department. The point of alignment between
the agencies is crucial, however, when suspected terrorists are charged
in federal court.77
A.

Alignment Basics

Alignment means an intelligence agency has worked closely
enough with law enforcement for Brady, Giglio, Rule 16, and the
Jencks Act to apply to that agency. When alignment exists in practice,
prosecutors do not rummage through an intelligence agency's vault and
determine what needs to be disclosed file by file. Instead, an
administrator without a law degree searches the intelligence files in
response to a laundry list from the prosecutor. After the search is
complete, the prosecutor, whose case-and license-are on the line,
will travel to the intelligence agency and apply the rules of discovery to
decide which of the found files, if any, need to be turned over to the
defense. Lawyers from the intelligence agency might intervene in the
76 429 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2006), amended on reconsideration, 429 F. Supp. 2d 46

(D.D.C. 2006).
77 See supra Part I.
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review of files to urge the prosecutor to err toward non-disclosure and
substitution. After the back and forth between spymasters and
prosecutors, the courts are the ultimate arbiters of what must be
disclosed.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual describes alignment as one of active
involvement by an agency in the investigation or prosecution. 78 Most
often, prosecutors should not become entangled with intelligence files
unless the facts of the case suggest an affirmative duty to do so. 79 The
Manual, echoing back to the historical division between law
enforcement and intelligence, is cautious:
Although coordination on matters of common concern is critical to
the proper functioning of the two communities, prosecutors must be
aware of the concomitant need of both communities to maintain a
well-delineated separation between criminal prosecutions and
foreign intelligence activities, in which less-stringent restraints apply
to the government.80
The Manual acknowledges the inevitable liaisons between
intelligence and law enforcement. More to the point, the Manual
suggests an obligation to search intelligence agency files "based not
upon a known duty to the defendant or to a known nexus to national
security matters but rather on the fact that the case meets a certain
profile of cases likely to implicate such issues." 8' This profile includes
terrorism cases. 82 All other things being equal, the more tailored the
defendant's request, explaining why pertinent files may be in the
intelligence community, the more likely the prosecutor must search.
Of all the discovery rules, Brady is probably the most difficult for
the aligned team to navigate because of its constitutional underpinnings.
To exclude the intelligence community from Rule 16, prosecutors can
cite cases in which probation officers are considered outside the
"government" for purposes of the rule. 83 Similarly, to exclude the
intelligence community from Jencks obligations, prosecutors can look
78 U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL

tit. 9, CRIMINAL

RESOURCE MANUAL § 2052(B)(1) (2006) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
to the US. Attorneys'Manual:

According

When an [intelligence community] component has actively participated in a criminal
investigation or prosecution-that is, has served in a capacity that exceeds the role of
providing mere tips or leads based on information generated independently of the
criminal case-it likely has aligned itself with the prosecution and its files are subject
to the same search as would those of an investigative law enforcement agency assigned
to the case.
Id.

79 Id. §2052(B)(2)(a).
80 Id. §90.2 10(A).
81 Id. §2052(B)(4).
82 Id.

83 See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 528 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding Brady
does not extend to reports held by the court or the probation office).
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for cases in which the Bureau of Prisons falls outside the scope of that
rule. Brady is thornier.
B.

The CircuitSplit ConcerningAlignment

Although the Supreme Court has not opined on alignment, the
federal circuits have been active in delineating a prosecutor's
obligations under Brady and other discovery rules. 84 Even so, these
cases tend to relate to agencies other than the CIA. Their usefulness for
our purposes depends on the strength of their analogy to the intelligence
community.85

4 See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 216-18 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding Brady did
not require disclosure of documents collected by Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
(PWBA) because PWBA was not part of the team that prosecuted defendant for embezzlement of
employee pension funds, money laundering, and conspiracy); United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d
104, 116 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding prosecution had no obligation to produce citizenship application
containing witness's perjury since the document was not in the prosecution's files, but at another
agency not under its supervision); United States v. Velte, 331 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that, because a weather station was not acting for government in collecting humidity
data, prosecutor not required to disclose this data to a defendant charged with willfully setting fire
to federal land); Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding Tennessee
investigator who testified on behalf of prosecution during sentencing phase of capital murder case
did not become part of Georgia prosecutor's team, such that Brady material in investigator's
hands had to be disclosed to defendant, when Tennessee law enforcement officers and Georgia
prosecutors had not shared resources); United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding state's knowledge and possession of potential impeachment evidence could not be
imputed to federal prosecutor for purposes of establishing Brady violation, especially when the
evidence resulted from an unrelated state investigation); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151,
1169-70 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding Brady did not require prosecutors to discover allegedly
exculpatory information at the Office of Thrift Supervision, SEC, or IRS because none of those
agencies investigated the case or participated in its prosecution); United States v. Santiago, 46
F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding U.S. Attorney's Office had access to Bureau of Prison
files because Office knew files existed, had been able to obtain one inmate's file, and both the
Office and the Bureau are part of DOJ); United States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993)
(declining to attribute knowledge of Omaha police to federal prosecutor); United States v.
Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding U.S. Attorney's obligation under Brady
extended to files in the homicide and internal affairs divisions of the District of Columbia police
department due to their close working relationship in the defendant's prosecution); United States
v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that information in personnel file of Post
Office employee was within prosecutor's possession), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
85 See generally Carole Gordon Rapoport, Note, Dream Team or Evidentiary Nightmare?
Defining When a Government Agency Is Partof the Prosecution Team, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 81, 82 n.6 (2004). For example, in United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441.

1443-44 (D. Colo. 1997), the court ordered the prosecution to request and review information
from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The court
described the prosecution's Brady burden as informing "themselves about everything that is
known in all of the archives and all of the data banks of all of the agencies collecting information
which could assist in the construction of alternative scenarios to that which they intend to prove at
trial." Id. at 1450.
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In all, the federal circuits have taken three approaches in deciding
whether a governmental agency is aligned with the prosecution team:
narrow, broad, and moderate. 86 The Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits define alignment narrowly. 87 According to these circuits, there
is no alignment without some concrete connection between a state or
federal entity and the prosecution.88 For example, in United States v.
Locascio,89 the Second Circuit found no alignment and no Brady
violation where federal prosecutors failed to disclose an exculpatory
report written by FBI agents not involved in the investigation. 90 Thus,
the Second Circuit, which includes the Southern District of New York,
might be an attractive venue for handling terrorism cases under CIPA.
In contrast, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits define alignment
broadly, taking a "monolithic view of government" and finding
alignment between agencies because the government is considered a
single entity. 91 In United States v. Osorio,92 for example, the court
ordered the prosecutor to turn over impeachment material about the
government's chief witness in a trial for conspiracy to possess and
distribute cocaine. 93 The prosecutor had failed to disclose that the U.S.
Attorney's Office and the FBI believed the chief witness previously
distributed roughly one to two kilograms of cocaine a week, a belief
which directly contradicted the witness's testimony. 94 The First Circuit
held that the prosecutor was "negligent" in carrying out his Giglio
obligations because he apparently failed to "make reasonable inquiry of
those in a position to have relevant knowledge." 95 The court observed
86 Compare Rapoport, supra note 85, at 92-96 (discussing the narrow, broad, and moderate
approaches the federal circuits have developed to define who is a member of the prosecution team
and how far the prosecution must go in its searches), with Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring
the Prosecutor'sDuty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material,88 CORNELL L.

REv. 1471, 1493-1510 (2003) (arguing for three general categories: "the 'prosecution team'
standard," "the availability/accessibility standard," and "the actual knowledge and possession"
standard).
87 Rapoport, supra note 85, at 92-93.
88 Id. at 92 n.75 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to hold Missouri prosecutor accountable for information Illinois prosecutor held)); see, e.g.,
United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971) (declining to impute Florida state
prosecutor's knowledge to Assistant U.S. Attorney).
89 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
90 Id. at 949-50.
91 Rapoport, supra note 85, at 92-93. The Tenth Circuit, in Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico

Department of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 1995), identified that the First and Third
Circuits have "taken an expansive view and have imputed a broad range of knowledge to the
prosecution." Id. at 824; see also United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993)
(finding alignment and violation of a Brady duty where prosecutors failed to "follow-up" after the
DEA did not respond to an initial request to advise the prosecutors of any payments made to a
witness).
92 929 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1991).
93 Id. at 756.
94 Id. at 757.

95 Id. at 760-61.
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that "[t]he prosecution of criminal activity is a joint enterprise" and
"'the government' is not a congery of independent hermetically sealed
compartments." 96 The First Circuit thus requires prosecutors, in
fulfilling their Giglio obligations, to seek out information possessed by
other governmental agencies. As a result, the First Circuit may be one
of the toughest for prosecuting terrorism cases involving classified
information.
The Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
take a moderate approach in defining alignment, reviewing the degree
of participation and cooperation between agencies on a case-by-case
basis. 97 For example, in United States v. Deutsch,98 the Fifth Circuit
found alignment between the Justice Department and the Post Office
Department because the government sought to call a Post Office
employee as its principal witness. 99 The court held that the two
agencies were too "closely connected" to avoid production of the
employee's personnel file. 00 And in United States v. Brooks,'0 the

District of Columbia Circuit found alignment because of the "close
working relationship between the [police department] and the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Columbia."l 02 On the other hand, unlike the
courts in Deutsch and Brooks, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Morrisl03 found no alignment because none of the three agencies in

question was part of the team that investigated and prosecuted the
criminal charges.1 04 Further, the defendants were not entitled to relief
under Brady because they could have obtained the information
themselves through the "exercise of reasonable diligence." 05
For CIPA cases, the lack of a precise discovery standard in the
federal circuits creates many complications. Working from the same
facts, sometimes spymasters and prosecutors reasonably disagree on
whether alignment exists on a criminal case. These disagreements
reinforce other differences. The CIA does not gather and store its
information in the same way that the FBI does.1 06 And the intelligence
96 Id. at 760.

97 Rapoport, supra note 85, at 94.
98 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973).
99 Id. at 57.
100 Id.

101 966 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
102 Id. at 1503.

103 80 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1996).
104 Id. at 1170.

105 Id. The defendants knew as much about the Office of Thrift Supervision, Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Internal Revenue Service investigations as the prosecution did.
106 Fredman, supra note 20, at 337-38. In highlighting the differences between the CIA and
the FBI, Fredman notes:
The documentary procedures of law enforcement agencies are highly specialized,
directly designed to support the investigation and prosecution of offenses; their formats
and modes of employment are not readily adaptable to intelligence agencies and their
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community, to start, is not as concerned with chains of custody and the
rules of evidence. 107 Hearsay from a human source or a foreign
intelligence service is often the best the intelligence community has for
American policymakers. In serving an insatiable demand for tips about
terrorists since 9/11, the CIA is not required to prove things beyond a
reasonable doubt.
C.

Fredman'sTake on Alignment

For years, Jonathan Fredman's Intelligence Agencies, Law
Enforcement and the Prosecution Team has been the key piece of

scholarship on alignment. 08 When Fredman wrote his article, the
"most destructive domestic terrorist attack in American history" 09 was
the Oklahoma City bombing.110 At that time, Fredman noted an uptick
in the U.S. prosecution of transnational crime. Drug traffickers and
other gangsters, it seemed, were going global.
A few years before KSM and his minions carried out the 9/11 plot,
Fredman concluded that careful planning was needed to allow
prosecutors to comply with discovery rules without unduly
compromising intelligence sources and methods."I He reminded us of
the statutory ban on an "internal security" function for the CIA as well
as the FBI's prominence in the domestic sphere.11 2 The collapse of
communism and an increase in international crime-including weapons
proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism-had begun to blur the
historical separation between the CIA and the FBI.11 3 Even before 9/11,
the neat boundaries that kept the CIA outside the United States and the
FBI inside the United States began to break down. Fredman, a
knowledgeable insider from the intelligence community, said U.S.
operations. Rather, the intelligence agencies organize and maintain their records in a
matter conducive to intelligence analysis and dissemination, rather than for potential
use as evidence.
Id
107 See id.
108 Id. at 331.
109 Id.

110 Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were charged and later convicted of the attack. See
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999);
United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 934 (1999).
111 Fredman, supra note 20, at 369.
112 See id. at 335; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 78, at tit. 9,

§ 90.210(A)

(describing law enforcement's main purposes to "identify, target, investigate, arrest, prosecute,
and convict" those who violate federal law while the intelligence community "perform[s]
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the
national security, including the collection of information and the production and dissemination of
intelligence").
113 See Fredman,supra note 20, at 335-36.
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agencies were adopting a "team" approach against international drug
traffickers and other criminals. 114 Over a decade ago, Fredman was
among the first to recognize that increased cooperation between
intelligence and law enforcement created complications. Fredman, back
then, laid down some parameters:
In general, the courts have held that federal discovery obligations
extend to those government agencies that are so closely "aligned"
with the prosecution of a specific matter that justice requires their
records be subject to the respective discovery obligations. The issue
also has been cast in terms of the "prosecution team," consisting of
those agencies whose activities so closely support a specific
prosecution that justice requires them to be subject to the discovery
obligations.... These issues arise because none of the discovery
rules explicitly define the intra-governmental limits of their
obligations. 115
From Fredman to today, from domestic to international terrorism,
the basic question remains: What sort of cooperation from an
intelligence agency subjects its files to discovery in criminal cases? The
rules, of course, do not provide much guidance. As Fredman stated,
"neither CIPA nor any other statute specifically addresses the extent to
which information in the possession of the intelligence community may
be subject in the first place to the defendant's rights of discovery or the
prosecution's obligation to search."ll 6 For this reason, Fredman
suggested that the question be resolved by "careful planning" and by
case law." 7 Given the inconsistent approaches the courts have taken," 8
this Article proposes that Congress hold hearings on alignment and
tackle the issue head-on by amending CIPA. While more than a decade
has gone by since Fredman's article, careful planning and case law still
have not done the trick.
Our constitutional structure does not provide an easy solution to
the conflicting demands of due process and secrecy. Failure to disclose
intelligence files to a defendant, undercutting transparency and
democracy, may violate rights spelled out in Brady and other cases."l 9
On the other hand, disclosure in even a single case may threaten the
nation's security by jeopardizing current sources of information, by
deterring future sources, or by compromising secret methods of
collection.12 0 These points stand true for all captured members of al

114 Id.

115 Id.
at 347.
116 Id.
at 338-39.
117 See id. at 369 ("Careful planning in specific situations may permit steps to avoid casting an

intelligence agency as part of the prosecution team.").
118 See supra Part 1I.B.
119 See supra Part II.A.

120 Fredman, supra note 20, at 338.
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Qaeda who are brought to federal court. At best, our constitutional
structure calls for balance.
To find a balance on alignment between the CIA and the FBI,
Fredman advocated a case-by-case approach.121 Easy cases are when
the prosecutor or the defendant knows that a file subject to discovery is
within the intelligence community. The prosecutor has a duty to search
for that file. When the prosecutor does not know of any pertinent files,
two extremes frame Fredman's analysis. At one extreme, if there is no
contact between intelligence and law enforcement, no passing of
personnel or information between the two, alignment does not exist. A
search under these circumstances would be a fishing expedition, and the
law does not require it. At the other extreme, if intelligence and law
enforcement work jointly on an investigation, alignment exists and a
search should be done. Moreover, some cases (Fredman mentioned the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) have an inherent
intelligence component that requires a search. 122 Between the extremes,
Fredman conceded that many difficult calls exist.123 As he observed,
the discovery obligations imposed on the intelligence community
should "neither [be] unduly circumscribed nor overly extended." 24
Again, it is a question of balance.
At times, Fredman accommodated the intelligence community. He
said that a defendant's request to search intelligence files should only be
honored upon a strong showing of necessity: "The significant resource
demands that otherwise would be placed upon prosecutors and
intelligence agencies, as well as the need to avoid unnecessary risks to
intelligence sources and methods, together counsel such a course." 25
At other times, Fredman accommodated law enforcement-and
defendants. On one case, Fredman was not too troubled by a search
through the intelligence community for files connected to the Oklahoma
City bombers. 126 To Fredman, this broad approach to discovery and
this loose theory of alignment served an "exceptional" case.127 Maybe
Fredman did not imagine-or care-that this exception would become
the rule.
Fredman's analysis did not deviate much, if at all, from the Justice
Department's party line about alignment.1 28 Fredman, although a part
121 Id. at 370-71.
122 Id. at 370.
123 Id.

124 Id. at 371.
125 Id. at 370-71.
126 Id. at 370.
127 Id.

128 Compare id. (observing that discovery would be appropriate when there is reason to
believe a particular intelligence agency may have information related to a case), with U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 78, at tit. 9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL

§ 2052(B)(4)
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of the intelligence community, did not question whether alignment
applied to intelligence agencies at all. Nor did he push for the most
restricted definition of alignment. Instead, he took a moderate approach
similar to that of the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.
Fredman tackled alignment from the pre-9/11 position. His
analysis was fine for the time. But, as I learned from my CIPA practice
at the CIA after 9/11, alignment is conceded more and more in practice,
and intelligence files are subject to deeper and deeper searches.
Looming ahead of us is the potential disaster of prosecuting al Qaeda
members in federal district court. In comparison to the current
terrorism cases, Timothy McVeigh-and even Zacarias Moussaouiwill stand as easy examples under CIPA. Contrary to Fredman, I would
like us to do more to challenge the conventional wisdom regarding
alignment.
D.

The Past,Present,and Future ofAlignment

Many people have complained about restrictions on a defendant's
access to classified information in terrorism proceedings, 129 but few
have directly questioned Fredman's approach to alignment. In the
minority, one student proposes a "cabined" approach to alignment.i 30
Under his proposal, the duty to discover and disclose intelligence
information only arises if an intelligence agency works at the
prosecutor's direction and control and only extends to material
produced during this relationship.131 In addition, the defendant's
request must be specific enough to indicate the nature and location of
the requested information.1 32 Other than this alternative, commentators
(stating that obligation to search intelligence agency files depends on whether "the case meets a
certain profile of cases likely to implicate such issues").
129 See Joshua L. Dratel, Sword or Shield? The Government's Selective Use of Its
DeclassificationAuthorityfor TacticalAdvantage in CriminalProsecutions,5 CARDOZO PUB. L.

POL'Y & ETHICS J. 171, 188-89 (2006) (arguing that government's selective declassification of
information, including withholding defendant's own conversations, amounts to an
unconstitutional tactical maneuver; CIPA, FISA, and Rule 16 should be modified to ensure
defendant's access to own intercepted communications); Victor Hansen & Lawrence Friedman,
The Case Against Secret Evidence, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 772, 817-18 (2007) (calling

for the Executive branch to give a clear articulation of purpose when restricting access in
terrorism cases); Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III
Courts, FISA, CIPA and EthicalDilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 203, 224-25,

232 (2006) (contending that over-classification, stretched definitions of terrorism offenses, and
the greater internationalization of crime and law enforcement threaten to distort the adversary
system, particularly when defense counsel with security clearances are excluded from discussions
about potential discovery).
130 See Villaverde, supra note 86, at 1529-32 (proposing a three-step approach to discovery of
classified information in an intelligence agency's files).
131 Id. at 1530-31.
132 Id. at 1531-32.
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have largely deferred to Fredman.1 33 After 9/11, the analysis of CIPA
should resist the tendency-illustrated by Fredman-to concede
alignment across the board.
Some commentators have responded at a more abstract level than
Fredman to greater integration between intelligence and law
enforcement. One commentator worries about potential cross-over
effects on civil liberties.13 4 Another is somewhat optimistic about an
emerging paradigm that "requires a cooperative relationship among
intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors, in
which there is acknowledgement from the outset that ... there may be
reckoning with a judge, a jury, and a defense counsel."l 35 Critical or
supportive, the commentary on CIPA faces a changing landscape. And
that landscape requires a new theory of alignment, one that reflects
increasing complications since 9/11.
If nothing else, Fredman's
analysis must be tested against the facts of the new century.
Today, striking a balance between secrecy and due process is more
difficult-and more important. Al Qaeda cases linger on the horizon.
As one article notes:
The administration's concern about revealing protected information
to an accused is understandable: it is the accused who has been
identified and charged with violations of the law of war and terrorist
actions directed against the United States. There is a lcgitimate fear
that, once the accused has access to this protected information, he
could seek to use it in furtherance of his own criminal conduct as
well as to aid the enemies of the United States.136
Classified information is arguably valued less in terms of its
substance than on the "tactical value that attaches to the way in which
the information was obtained, from which foreign counterintelligence
agents might learn a great deal about the nation's intelligence-gathering
capabilities." 3 7 In other words, the use of classified information in

133 See, e.g., Fred F. Manget, Intelligence and the CriminalLaw System, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y

REv. 415, 422 & n.33 (2006) (noting that "[o]ther commentators have covered [the interaction
between intelligence and the criminal law system] with great thoroughness" and citing Fredman);
Daniel Richman, Prosecutorsand Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.

REV. 749, 817 n.308 (2003) (recommending Fredman's article "[flor an exploration of the special
problems raised by the involvement of intelligence agencies in a criminal investigation").
134 Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENv. U. L. REV. 335, 335

(2005) (expressing concern that two paradigm shifts in the war on terror, viewing terrorism as a
military issue instead of a law enforcement issue and greater centralization of intelligence and law
enforcement, have had an adverse effect on civil liberties).
135 Richard B. Schiff, A CounterintelligencePerspective, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

and Love the Wall, 52 FED. LAW. 32, 35-36 (2005) ("We need not look longingly backward, but
rather intelligence agencies and their new best friends, prosecutors, need to understand that, at
least as far as the government's responsibility for discovery is concerned, the collapse of the wall
has been a mixed blessing.").
136 Hansen & Friedman, supra note 129, at 778.
137 Id. at 789.
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terrorism cases increases the risk that intelligence sources and methods
will be exposed, an exposure that undercuts national security. To be
effective in protecting our country, the intelligence community must be
able to honor the promises it makes to human sources and to liaison
services. No one will work with the CIA, after all, if it fails to protect
secrets. That said, classification should not be a means for the
intelligence community to cover up embarrassments and crimes. One
word Fredman and I keep coming back to is balance.
Updates to CIPA should also take into account changes in other
statutes. At the time of Fredman's writing, the CIA was allowed to
obtain information outside the U.S. about non-U.S. citizens on behalf of
law enforcement agencies.13 8 Law enforcement and intelligence
agencies were further fused together when the PATRIOT Act was
passed. 139 This statute, passed after 9/11, called for "expediti[ous]
disclos[ure] ... of foreign intelligence acquired by . .. the Department
of Justice or an element of such department or agency . .. in the course

of a criminal investigation" to intelligence personnel. 140 In 2004, the
Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA),141 in
creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, expanded
the definition of "intelligence" to include any intelligence related to
national security, without regard to the source of the information.1 42
IRTPA "provid[ed] and facilitat[ed] the means for sharing terrorism
information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal
entities, and the private sector,"1 43 and added incentives for
information-sharing.1 44 IRTPA also called on the FBI to "continue
efforts to improve [its] intelligence capabilities . . . and to develop and

maintain within the Bureau a national intelligence workforce."l 4 5 All in
all, strict compartmentalization between the CIA and the FBI was
supposed to disappear.146 CIPA, passed many years before 9/11, should
138 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293, § 814, 110 Stat.
3461, 3483 (1996) ("[Ellements of the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United
States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals
who are not United States persons. Such elements may collect such information notwithstanding
that the law enforcement agency intends to use the information collected for purposes of a law
enforcement investigation or counterintelligence investigation.").
139 See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
140 See id. § 905, 115 Stat. at 388.
141 Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
142 Id. § 1012, 118 Stat. at 3662 ("The terms 'national intelligence' and 'intelligence related to
national security' refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived ....
143 Id. § 1016, 118 Stat. at 3664-65.
144 Id. § 1016, 118 Stat. at 3666.
145 Id. § 2001, 118 Stat. at 3700.
146 Manget, supra note 133, at 420 ("Every major recent review of U.S. intelligence policy and
organization has called for increased information sharing, unity of command and control, and
removal of barriers to joint and complementary action among U.S. government departments and
agencies. The wall [between law enforcement and intelligence activities] is gone.").
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not be used to erase all these statutory incentives for CIA and FBI
cooperation.
The Department of Justice has taken the lead in deciding whether
alignment exists between spymasters and prosecutors. The intelligence
The U.S.
community, meanwhile, has stayed in the shadows.
Attorneys' Manual, as noted, errs on the side of caution, not wanting to
create unnecessary issues for its prosecutors in criminal cases. As far as
the public knows, the intelligence community has no written rules or
regulations about alignment. Instead, they depend on the Justice
Department to take the lead in handling discovery requests in espionage,
terrorism, and other cases involving classified information. This
continues to be the case under President Obama.
The relevant portion of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, written before
9/11, states that alignment exists if the intelligence community has
"actively participa[ted]" in the investigation or the prosecution of a
particular case. 147 What active participation means, however, very
much depends on point of view. Spymasters, not wanting information,
personnel, or sources and methods to be pulled into court, have an
interest in denying that circumstances constitute active involvement.
Prosecutors, under the same circumstances, might argue that active
involvement exists.
Prosecutors, to be sure, recognize that not every interaction
between agencies is alignment. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual reminds
them that, for alignment to exist, the intelligence community's role must
exceed "providing mere tips or leads based on information generated
independently of the criminal case."l 48 Or, as Fredman noted in his
article, the CIA may pass off an informant to the DEA so that the law
enforcement agency conducts the interview, writes the report, and takes
custody of any physical evidence.149 If the pass-off occurs at the
beginning of an investigation, alignment is unlikely to exist. But passoffs do not take care of all problems.
Reassessing how alignment works requires new thinking about the
interaction between spymasters and prosecutors. Rather than speak
about intelligence sources and methods in the abstract, a reassessment
should actually factor in the human interests of intelligence officers and
their sources. Lives and limbs are at stake. As soon as possible, the
Director of National Intelligence should task the CIA Director and the
Attorney General to review the government's policy on alignment. The
findings from their task force could lay the foundations for Congress to
amend CIPA by statute. This amendment is of utmost importance since
147 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 78, at tit. 9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE

MANUAL § 2052(B)(1).
148 Id.
149 See Fredman, supra note 20, at 369.
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the Justice Department has flirted with the idea of handling KSM and
other high-level members of al Qaeda by civilian trial.
With the breakdown of the wall between intelligence and law
enforcement, the possibility of alignment on criminal cases has
increased since 9/11. To keep the system calibrated, a principled means
must be applied to make alignment the exception rather than the rule.
The outer limits to alignment are easy to state-for Fredman or for me.
Alignment does not exist when one FBI agent on the criminal case was
on the distribution list for an intelligence report from the CIA. Further,
alignment does not exist where a prosecutor, by virtue of changes in the
PATRIOT Act, shares grand jury information with the CIA. Alignment
is not a game of tag in which one contact between intelligence and law
enforcement triggers a prosecutor's discovery obligations. At the other
end of possibilities, alignment does exist if the FBI and the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center exchange personnel and several documents
against a suspected terrorist. Between these clear limits on alignment,
there is a wide swath of ambiguity and the potential for reasonable
differences of opinion.
The determinations that prosecutors, the courts, and law professors
make as to whether alignment exists must not be random. Randomness
is much worse than case-by-case analysis. Prosecutors, the courts, and
spymasters deserve better guidance. To provide that guidance, the
executive branch might synthesize the bits and pieces of advice from the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual into a more comprehensive checklist. This
could be done through an executive order. Even better, after review by
a task force, the White House might propose a congressional stamp on
what constitutes alignment. That stamp could actually come through an
amended statute that includes appropriate cross-references to the rules
of discovery and to CIPA. As long as the two elected branches of
government do not cross into constitutional territory, together they can
go much farther than Fredman did in guiding the intelligence
community and law enforcement into the new century. Moreover,
unlike the musings of a law review article, a statute has the force of law.
Brady, although tied to the Fifth Amendment, is not absolute.
Congress, if explicit, can trade due process for national security,
determining that alignment applies to the CIA only when it has most
actively participated in the criminal investigation. That, by itself, would
be a significant change. In other words, the statutory framework that
was created in 1980 needs remodeling. Once this general fact is
accepted, the debate can move on to the specific contours of the new
design. My goal is to inspire readers to offer their designs. My design,
one of infinite possibilities, reflects a hunch that things have tilted too
much against the intelligence community. The Bush Administration,
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for all its faults and abuses, shared this hunch in keeping many terrorism
cases out of federal court.
II.

HANDLING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AT TRIAL

Not only does CIPA fail to state a clear standard on alignment, it
fails to clarify what happens with classified information at trial. What is
relevant and admissible at trial is, in practice, a small subset of the
information the parties discover before trial. The defendant's gateway
to discovery, so to speak, is much larger than the gateway for use at
trial.
Section 6(a) of CIPA allows a court, at an in camera hearing, to
determine the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information.
While § 6 spells out procedures, 150 it does not contain a specific
standard for admissibility. 15 1 The federal circuits, as a result, have split
regarding the appropriate standard. One side acknowledges that the
evidence is classified and considers its sensitivity (top secret, secret, or
confidential) in determining admissibility. 152 The other side disregards
the sensitivity of the evidence and focuses on relevance. 153 Each side
believes its interpretation of CIPA is correct. If the Supreme Court does
not resolve this split,154 Congress should adopt the Fourth Circuit's
approach to handling secrets at trial.
A.

Smith's HeightenedStandardfor Admissibility

The Fourth Circuit suggests that judges should consider the
classified nature of the evidence when ruling on its admissibility at trial.
United States v. Smith 55 was the first to present this approach. The
circuit later employed the approach in cases such as United States v.
Fernandez156 and United States v. Zettl.'57

150 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a), (c), (e) (2006).
151 Scholars agree that Congress intentionally failed to articulate which admissibility standard
should be employed when determining the admissibility of classified evidence. See, e.g.,
Salgado, supra note 47, at 437 ("Congress simply left it up to the judicial branch to develop the
appropriate evidentiary test [for admissibility], and stated only that the current standard was not
changed by CIPA."). This is significant in determining legislative intent for the admissibility
standard.
152 See infra Part W.A.
153 See infra Part IV.B.

154 If the Supreme Court intervenes, it too should adopt the Fourth Circuit approach.
155 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
156 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Smith, a former intelligence agency employee, was prosecuted for
espionage in the Eastern District of Virginia.' 5 8 For $11,000, he
allegedly gave KGB agent Victor 1. Okunev details of five U.S. doubleagent operations.1 59 In his defense, Smith argued that the CIA ordered
him to divulge the secrets in an authorized operation.160 According to
Smith, two men named White and Ishida, who said they were CIA
agents, approached him while he was abroad and asked him to do a job
for the Agency.'' To support his version of the facts, Smith sought to
admit classified information at trial to show he had reason to believe
White and Ishida were legitimate CIA agents who could order him to
disclose information to Okunev.1 62 The government, opposed to
Smith's version of facts, claimed that White and Ishida were fabricators
and that Smith's offer of proof was a blatant attempt at graymail.16 3
The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that though the evidence
was relevant to Smith's defense, it could be excluded from trial because
of its classified nature.164 The majority recognized a government
privilege that protected national security secrets, including intelligence
sources and methods.16 5 Further, the Fourth Circuit called on trial
courts to balance the government's interest in nondisclosure of
classified information against the defendant's need for disclosure.166
When weighing these interests, a trial judge should consider the crime
charged, the possible defense, the significance of the information, and
other relevant factors.1 67 Even so, the government's privilege is
qualified, and must give way when the information "is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause." 68 Smith suggests disclosure is only
157 889 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1989). Smith and Zetti both involved espionage charges, and the
defendants in Fernandez and Smith, both intelligence agency employees at one time, asserted a
"CIA defense."
158 United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 427 (E.D. Va. 1984), vacated, 780 F.2d 1102.
159 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.

163 Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 434.
164 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1110. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit panel found the
information to be relevant and admissible. See Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 437; United States v.
Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984).
165 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108-09.
166 Id. at 1107. The en banc majority remanded the case to the district court to use the
balancing standard in ruling on the admissibility of the information. Id. at 1110.
167 See id. at 1107; cf Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (recognizing a
privilege to withhold the identity of government informants).

168 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1107 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61) (internal quotation marks
omitted); cf Salgado, supra note 47, at 434 ("Under Roviaro, the government cannot prosecute a

defendant without disclosing information 'relevant and helpful' to the defendant, regardless of
whether or not the government has a weighty interest in maintaining the secrecy of that
information.").
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appropriate when the information is essential or necessary to the
defense and not "merely cumulative nor corroborative." 1 69 In other
words, decisions under § 6 of CIPA are more complicated than a
straight application of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Fourth Circuit was confident that its approach was consistent
with Congress's intent in enacting CIPA.170 And the court adopted this
view even though it conceded that: (1) Congress intended to retain the
standards on admissibility; 17 1 and (2) substantive law was not otherwise

changed.172
To justify its balancing test under CIPA, the Fourth Circuit relied
heavily on Roviaro v. United States,173 a Supreme Court decision that

recognized the government's "informant privilege" in criminal cases.174
The Smith court reasoned that Roviaro allows the government to
withhold the identity of an informant from the defendant to protect the
safety of the informant and to aid law enforcement; likewise, the
government may withhold secrets from defendants to protect an
The informant's
intelligence agency's sources and methods.175
privilege, as the Supreme Court had made clear, encourages people to
report criminal activity by ensuring their safety as law enforcement
sources.' 7 6 The same analysis applies to protecting intelligence
sources.' 77 To emphasize this point, the Smith court identified the
169 See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1110 (citing Harley v. United States, 682 F.2d 1018, 1021 (1982);
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 535 (1964); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254
(1938)); cf United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("The
Fourth Circuit declined to establish a 'rigid rule' for the proper balance, stating that it would vary
from case to case depending on the crime charged, how essential the information was to the
defense, and whether the information was merely cumulative or corroborative." (citing Smith, 780
F.2d at 1110)).
170 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1106 n.8.
171 Id. ("[The Senate] report provides... 'on the question of a standard for admissibility of
evidence at trial, the committee intends to retain current law."' (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra
note 21, at 8, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4302)).
172 Id. at 1106 ("No new substantive law was created by the enactment of CIPA.").
173 353 U.S. 53.

174 See Shea, supra note 44, at 694 ("The Roviaro balancing test was first applied to questions
of admissibility of evidence at trial by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Smith."); see also
Salgado, supra note 47, at 440-41 ("[T]he court cited Roviaro as authority, claiming that it was
not extending that holding.").
175 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108. According to the Smith court:
The government interest protected by nondisclosure [in both cases] is analogous. The
government has a substantial interest in protecting sensitive sources and methods of
gathering information. The gathering of such information and the methods used
resemble closely the gathering of law enforcement information. The confidentiality of
sources and the methods used in both instances are critical. Persons who supply
information to the government regarding matters taking place in foreign countries are
likely to be located outside the United States. Their safety would immediately be
placed in jeopardy if their identity were made public.
Id.
176 See id. at 1107.
177 See id. at 1108.
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illogic of a privilege that protected domestic informants but not foreign
informants.' 7 8 In sum, the Fourth Circuit held that a national security
privilege existed when CIPA was passed, although the government had
not yet invoked the privilege.179
While the Fourth Circuit's view of § 6 is in the minority among
federal circuits, 80 its analysis is quite significant. Even courts that
disagree with the Fourth Circuit on § 6 have paid attention to the Smith
analysis.181 Many circuits-even those that reject the Smith balancing
test at § 6(a) hearings on the use and admissibility of information at
trial-apply a variation of Smith to § 4 decisions on whether classified
information must be provided to the defendant in discovery.1 82 Because
the CIA's headquarters are in Northern Virginia, many cases that
involve CIPA-espionage and otherwise-are prosecuted in the Fourth
Circuit. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's consonance with intelligence
178 See id. at 1109. The court noted:
To give the domestic informer of the police more protection than the foreign informer
of the CIA seems to us to place the security of the nation from foreign danger on a
lower plane than the security of the nation from the danger from domestic criminals.
In our opinion the national interest is as well served by cooperation with the CIA as
with the domestic police.
Id.
179 See id. The Smith court explained that, even before CIPA, the prosecution could have
invoked the privilege at trial; CIPA's basic change was that it required the assertion of the
privilege and the application of the balancing test before trial. In fact, the court reasoned that
"[a]doption of Smith's argument would result in a substantive change in the law of evidence,
exactly what Congress said CIPA was not designed to do." Id.
180 See infra Part IV.B.
181 See, e.g., United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining
Smith's holding and reasoning); United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (delineating the Smith test but choosing the approach of the district court judge in United

States v. Lopez-Lima), af'd sub nom. United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1998);

United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (laying out the
development and the use of the Smith test in the Fourth Circuit).
182 For the discovery stage, the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted an approach that
balances the government's need for secrecy against a defendant's interest in disclosure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that Smith requires the trial
court to take "cognizance of both the state's interest in protecting national security and the
defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial"); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("On issues of discovery, the court can engage in balancing."); United States v.
Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming a district court determination that
national security would be damaged if classified materials were handed over to the defendant). In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit simply requires that the evidence be helpful, as well as relevant to the
defense, before disclosure of classified information is required in discovery. United States v.
Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he government is not required to provide criminal
defendants with information that is neither exculpatory nor, in some way, helpful to the
defense."). The District of Columbia Circuit uses a higher standard of relevancy-the
information must be relevant and helpful as required by the Roviaro test-but it has "neither
adopt[ed] nor reject[ed] the balancing test set forth in Smith." United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d
617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 457 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
2006) ("As in Yunis I, we also need not consider whether, if the information were helpful, it could
nonetheless be withheld if 'the government's need to keep the information secret' outweighed the
'defendant's interest in disclosure."').

REMODELING CIPA

2010]

469

interests may cause the Justice Department to file charges in the Eastern
District of Virginia instead of other possible venues.
B.

Other Approaches to Admissibility

Circuits that reject the Fourth Circuit's balancing test at trial apply
various analyses.183 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, ruled that when
determining whether information was material or not, a court should
ignore the classified nature of the information. 184 For courts that do not
engage in balancing, § 6(a) hearings concerning the use, relevance, or
admissibility of classified information consist of several
determinations.18 5 To begin, the court determines whether the proffered
defense is viable.186 If so, the defendant has the burden of showing that
the classified information is relevant to the defense.1 87 In determining
relevance, the court simply considers the information under Rules 401
and 402 in the Federal Rules of Evidence.18 8 Finally, because not all
relevant information is admissible, the court determines if the proffered
information should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial, misleading, or
confusing under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.189 Again, the burden
183 The Second Circuit does not apply a balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 750
F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984). But see United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2008)
(adopting the Rovario standard to determine whether the government's privilege must give way
in a CIPA case). The Ninth Circuit does not identify the opposing approaches or cite the Smith
decision, but does not explicitly engage in balancing. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d
1255, 1276 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988). The
District of Columbia Circuit and Eleventh Circuit both strongly reject the Smith approach. See
Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 42 ("It is Smith's balancing mandate which this court cannot accept.");
United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe district court
may not take into account the fact that evidence is classified when determining its 'use, relevance,
or admissibility."'); Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. at 1571, affdsub nom. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 ("The

Court ... declines to adopt the additional Fourth Circuit balancing test in determining the
relevance and admissibility of classified information."); Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. at 1407, 1411
n.7 ("Prior Eleventh Circuit decisions indicate that, when making relevancy and admissibility
determinations under § 6(c), a district court must apply the general relevancy standard of F.R.E.
401."); cf United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
ordinary rules of evidence, namely 401 and 403, should be used to determine admissibility under
CIPA); United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying F.R.E. 401 to
conclude that defendant's offer of proof of prior relationship with government agencies was
admissible and therefore wrongly excluded by the district court judge).
184 Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d at 1364.
185 See, e.g., Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
186 Id. at 1570.
187 Id.

188 Id. at 1571.

189 Id. Relevant information can be excluded in jurisdictions that follow the "straight
relevance" approach. Some cases have found that, given the controversial character of counterintelligence operations, information purporting to show the defendant acted under CIA authority
when he committed the prosecuted acts is prejudicial, and that this prejudice substantially
outweighs the evidence's probative value. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508,
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rests on the defendant to show that the probative value is not
substantially outweighed by negative factors.1 90 Throughout these
determinations, the court refrains from considering whether the
information is classified or vital to national security.191 The court, in
this manner, reads the Fourth Circuit's Smith balancing out of the
analysis. 192
While the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits expressly reject the Smith
balancing test, the best arguments against balancing come from Smith
itself.'93 The district court opinion and the two appellate opinions by
Judge John Butzner-one for a Fourth Circuit panel and one in
dissent-all together provide valid criticisms of the en banc
approach.194 Judge Butzner interpreted congressional statements that
"nothing in the conference [committee bill] is intended to change the
existing standards for determining relevance and admissibility" to mean
that judges should look only to Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to determine the admissibility of classified
information.1 95 Criticizing what he saw as Smith's expansion of the
informant's privilege, Judge Butzner argued that the Roviaro standard
was not appropriate for CIPA because Congress had contemplated and
rejected Roviaro during CIPA's legislative history.196 Roviaro, Butzner
said, dealt with the discovery, not the admissibility of information
1519 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding classified information that supported defendant's CIA defense
was inadmissible under F.R.E. 403 because it would divert the jury's attention from the charges).
190 Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
191 Id. at 1571.

192 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
193 Cf Salgado, supra note 47, at 440-41 (describing Judge Butzner's dissent from the en banc
decision). In rejecting the Smith balancing test, the Libby court relied on Judge Butzner's dissent.
See United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2006).
194 For the district court opinion, see United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1984).
For Judge Butzner's panel decision, see United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1984).
For Judge Butzner's dissent from the en banc decision, see UnitedStates v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102,
1111 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
195 See Smith, 750 F.2d at 1217 n.4 (interpreting H.R. REP. No. 96-1436, at 12 (1980),
reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4307, 4310). Other courts have made similar points. See United
States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1364 (1lth Cir. 1994) (interpreting Congressional
intent to require that "[tihe relevance of classified information in a given case is governed solely
by the well-established standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence."); United States v.
Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Both documentary and testimonial evidence
containing classified matter may be admitted if in conformity with the Federal Rules of
Evidence."). Note that the Smith en banc opinion also cited such statements but argued the
government's privilege and the balancing test were part of the existing standard. Smith, 780 F.2d
at 1107.
196 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1111-12 (Butzner, J., dissenting) ("Congress was aware of the
government's desire to impress on pending legislation the standard of admissibility of classified
evidence derived from Roviaro. . . ."); see also Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 40 ("[The balancing]
standard was rejected by Congress."). But see Salgado, supra note 47, at 437 ("Congress knew
that rejecting the administration's language would not necessarily preclude courts from using the
Roviaro standard. Congress simply left it up to the judicial branch to develop the appropriate
evidentiary test, and stated only that the current standard was not changed by CIPA.").
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already in the defendant's possession.' 97 Judge Butzner was more
inclined to agree with the trial court's observation that "[a] court is illequipped to determine, and a defendant [is] without means to challenge,
the extent to which disclosure of particular items of classified
information would damage the national security."1 98 Therefore, it
would be inappropriate, if not impossible, for the court to weigh the
national security interest in a § 6(a) hearing.
Many judges and scholars, in opposition to the views expressed in
this Article, agree with Judge Butzner. In particular, one scholar argues
that CIPA precludes an informed judicial decision at the § 6(a)
hearing. 199 By CIPA's terms, the government may neither explain the
basis for classification nor the potential damage to national security
from disclosure until: (1) the § 6(a) hearing is complete; (2) a court
determines the information is admissible; and (3) the government moves
for substitution or summaries under § 6(c). 200 Because the court does
not have what it needs to conduct the balancing test during a § 6(a)
20 1
hearing, so the argument goes, it should not be required to do so.
C.

The Smith Balancing Test Since 9/11

As already noted, some cases after 9/11 have refused to apply the
Smith balancing test for § 6(a) admissibility. 202 Until CIPA is updated,
these precedents stand as obstacles to bringing terrorism cases into
federal court. Nonetheless, the Obama Administration apparently
concluded that these obstacles were not insurmountable when it
designated KSM for trial in civilian court.
Even in the Fourth Circuit, Smith is being undermined. In United
States v. Rosen, 203 officials of a pro-Israel lobbying organization were
charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with conspiring to commit
197 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1112 (Butzner, J., dissenting). As the Libby court explained, Roviaro
and its progeny "stand solely for the proposition that a balancing must be employed before the
discovery of classified information may be required... . Roviaro was not intended to 'exclude
the introduction of relevant evidence known to the defendant."' Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 42
(quoting Smith, 780 F.2d at 1112 (Butzner, J., dissenting)).
198 Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 436. The district court also asserted that, because the interests of the
nation always outweigh a defendant's interests, balancing is dangerously loaded against
individual justice. Id.
199 Salgado, supra note 47, at 441-42.
200 See id.
201 Id.

202 See, e.g., Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 40-44 (arguing that since Congress considered and

rejected a heightened relevance standard when passing CIPA, § 6(a) implicitly precludes adopting
a common law, classified information privilege with a standard of relevance stricter than F.R.E.
401); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing other courts that have ignored the information's
classified nature).
203 520 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Va. 2007).
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espionage by transmitting information related to the national defense to
individuals not entitled to receive it.204 The government alleged that
they came by this information not by their own spying but through a
willing source in the Department of Defense. Pursuant to CIPA, the
government asked the court to allow the use of summaries, redactions,
and substitutions in lieu of classified information at trial. 205 Of
particular importance under CIPA was whether the government
possesses a common law privilege in classified information, and, if so,
what showing the defendant must make to overcome the privilege. 206
The Rosen court found the answer to the first part of the question
to be clear: Fourth Circuit precedent establishes "that the government
has a common law privilege in classified information and that this
privilege is not displaced by CIPA." 207 But as to overcoming the
privilege in the second part, the district court leaned toward the
defendants' analysis. The government, relying on Smith, argued that
"the privilege is not overcome unless the information as to which the
privilege is claimed is 'essential to the defense.' 208 To counter this
argument, the defendants pointed to Moussaoui as additional support for
the "relevant and helpful" standard. 209 The court determined that a
defendant has two ways of defeating the government's privilege:
showing that the information "is relevant and helpful to the
defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination of a cause." 210

Shifting from the Fourth Circuit's Smith analysis, the district court also
concluded that courts must not engage in any balancing of the
government's interest in nondisclosure against the defendant's interest
in disclosure. 211 Instead, "the 'balancing' [a court] must conduct is
primarily, if not solely, an examination of whether . .. the information
204 Id. at 789. Information relating to the national defense is also known as "NDI."
205 Id. at 788. The government also moved to use the "silent witness rule" with respect to
certain classified information. Id. The silent witness rule was described in United States v. Zettl,
835 F.2d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1987) as follows:
[T]he witness would not disclose the information from the classified document in open
court. Instead, the witness would have a copy of the classified document before him.
The court, counsel and the jury would also have copies of the classified document.
The witness would refer to specific places in the document in response to questioning.
The jury would then refer to the particular part of the document as the witness
answered. By this method, the classified information would not be made public at trial
but the defense would be able to present that classified information to the jury.
See also infra Part IV.A.
206 Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
207 Id.

208 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985)).
209 Id (citing United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472 (4th Cir. 2004)).
210 Id. at 800-01 (quoting Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 472) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 801 n.25 ("At best, the distinction between the two standards is a fine one, and it is a
virtue of the result reached here that it avoids courts having to make judgments based on such fine
distinctions.").
211 Id. at 801.
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the government seeks to withhold is material to the defense." 212 In light
of these rulings and other problems in the case, the government dropped
the charges.
In addition to the Eastern District of Virginia, the District of
Columbia has had its fair share of CIPA action. In United States v.
Libby, 213 the court declined to use the Smith balancing test. 214 Despite
the court's pro-defendant interpretation of CIPA, the jury convicted
defendant I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby-Vice President Cheney's former
chief of staff-of obstructing justice, making false statements, and
committing perjury, all related to the outing of Valerie Plame as a
covert CIA employee. 215 Even so, Libby, as an insider case, did not
present the same potential for graymail as handling al Qaeda outsiders
in civilian court. Averting disaster on one case does not mean it will be
averted on other cases.
Before trial in the Libby case, the parties made filings under § 6(a)
to address the "use, relevance, and admissibility" of classified
information at trial. 216 Not only did the parties disagree on the
evidentiary value of the classified information, they disagreed on the
standard for precluding any information from use during trial. 217 The
defense argued that the court must "simply apply" the Federal Rules of
Evidence while the government argued that the court should engage in a
three-step inquiry. 218 The government said that when the privilege
applied, the classified information should be precluded from use in any
form at trial unless the court determines: (1) the document is relevant;
(2) the document is "helpful to the defense"; and (3) the defendant's
interest in disclosure outweighs the government's need to protect the
classified information. 219 Because the court found that neither
legislative history nor case law supported the government's three-step
proposal, the court rejected it.22 0
The D.C. District Court's interpretation of CIPA, to be sure, was
not unreasonable. During congressional hearings that preceded CIPA's
enactment, the Justice Department sought a heightened standard for

212 Id. (quoting Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476). The court noted: "[T]he government may
propose substitutions, which may be accepted if fair to defendants, or if not accepted, the
government may nonetheless refuse to allow the information's admission at trial, but would be
subject to an appropriate sanction." Id. at 801-02 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c), (e) (2006)).
213 453 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2006).
214 Id at 42.

215 Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35
(D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-394), 2007 WL 2478128.
216 Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
217 Id. at 38.
218 Id
219 Id.

220 Id. at 40.
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admissibility of classified information. 221 The Department, set on that
goal, asked for language that made classified information admissible
only if "relevant and material." 222 (Contrast the government's proposal
of "material" with Libby's proposal of "helpful.") The court noted that
Congress rejected the government's proposed standard, making clear
that "[n]othing in [CIPA] is intended to change the existing standards
for determining relevance and admissibility." 223 The court thus held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence alone determine the admissibility of
classified information at trial.
Despite these recent cases, Smith provides a better balance between
the interests of the intelligence community and the rights of a criminal
defendant. Even those courts that claim to make § 6 decisions under a
straight application of the Federal Rules of Evidence can reach the
Smith result through a sleight-of-hand. The Federal Rules of Evidence,
after all, rest on the foundation of common law privileges and are
flexible enough to accommodate various interests in doing justice.
Courts outside the Fourth Circuit can manipulate their analyses under
Rules 401, 402, and 403 to achieve what they perceive as fair results.
Having al Qaeda cases in civilian court should prod changes to
CIPA itself and to practices under CIPA. Pure civil libertarian
arguments should be tempered for the new era. Congress, for a start,
should amend CIPA to clarify that all courts should apply Smith. The
difference between Smith and other holdings, all nuances aside, is not so
great that it implicates a fundamental right to due process. Courts that
give defendants the benefit of straight relevance under § 6 of CIPA do
so not as a matter of constitutional law, but as statutory interpretation,
clouded or guided by their own notions of fairness in criminal trials.
Congress, to be clear, has room to act. If more cases are to be
brought from the dark side under President Obama, some
accommodations should be made to the intelligence community. Up
front, the necessary adjustments to CIPA can be made more quickly and
clearly through an amendment to the statute rather than case-by-case
tinkering with the law. Congress should now give the Justice
Department the heightened standard of admissibility that was denied
when CIPA was first enacted.

Id.
222 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
221

223 Id. at 38 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 59, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

4310) (alteration in original).
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OTHER ADJUSTMENTS FOR TERRORISM TRIALS

Intelligence officers, fearing exposure to foreign intelligence
services and to other dangers, keep their distance from public trials.
They do not want the world to know they have been conducting
espionage for the United States; they and their human sources would be
at risk. Every so often, however, justice can only be done by hearing
from an intelligence officer or someone else from the secret world. A
witness may be needed to authenticate a piece of evidence or to solve a
hearsay problem. So at times the CIA gives in to the Justice
Department. But if we are to encourage prosecuting terrorism cases in
civilian courts, some accommodations should be made to the
intelligence community.
A.

Closed Proceedings,Jury Selection,
and Special Witnesses

Our perceptions and our practices should be updated for terrorism
trials. Under an old-fashioned view of the Bill of Rights, closing
portions of a criminal trial is shocking. The American trial process
emphasizes transparency, and almost all American courts have galleries
to welcome the media and the public. Indeed, transparency is one check
on abuses. Transparency, however, should be balanced against the
potential costs of exposing classified information to the public in the
courtroom.
The public's First Amendment right to watch a civilian trial and
the suspected terrorist's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers
are not absolute. As with many other constitutional rights, these two
rights can be calibrated to accommodate other interests and concerns.
In terrorism cases, national security is part of a balance in which
protecting intelligence sources and methods is a vital interest. To
protect intelligence officers, courts have gone step by step from silent
witnesses, to disguises, to pseudonyms, to screens behind which
witnesses conceal themselves. These practices are precursors to closing
the gallery and excluding the public for a witness or two during trial.
In terrorism cases, the public's right to watch the trial and the
defendant's right to a fair trial must be calibrated to special
circumstances. In other cases, the identities of informants have been
protected and juvenile victims have been spared from looking their
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alleged abusers in the eye. 224 Congress, by updating CIPA, should now
give federal courts a boost in protecting intelligence sources and
methods. Congress should provide the intelligence community the
same care and respect courts provide to tipsters in organized crime cases
and to juvenile victims in sexual assault cases.
When compared to substituted evidence under CIPA (or dismissed
civil cases under the state-secrets privilege), closing portions of a
criminal trial is not so shocking. Judges, exercising the discretion CIPA
now grants them, might propose closing portions of criminal trials to
accommodate the intelligence community's interests in protecting very
sensitive information. Or more cautious judges might wait for Congress
to amend CIPA so that closed portions are more explicitly
contemplated, namely through a witness who testifies only in front of
the judge, jury, and the parties. The gallery would remain empty for
that part of the trial. To reduce a prosecutor's temptation to dress up an
ordinary case in national security garb, the Attorney General's approval
might be required on any request for closed proceedings. Given a
willingness to adjust CIPA, there are many ways to do justice in cases
involving suspected terrorists.
In addition to closing portions of a trial, a court might allow the
government to do a cursory vetting of the venire during jury selection to
make sure there are no obvious security risks in the form of a known or
a suspected agent of a foreign power. Those potential jurors who pose a
security risk could then be excused from the venire for cause. (I
assume, without adding pages of text, that this excusal does not run
afoul of the Sixth Amendment and other constitutional provisions.)
Although the government cannot vet people to the top-secret level in a
day or so, when necessary, the government can vet to the secret level in
a very short time. The goal for terrorism cases would be a jury cleared
to receive classified information.
New protections in CIPA cases might actually result in a
The
corresponding openness by prosecutors toward defendants.
intelligence community, working with prosecutors, might be more
willing to allow a closed portion of a trial to delve into classified areas
because, compared to a completely open trial, fewer people would be
privy to the information. And our intelligence community would be
reasonably sure that foreign intelligence services would not be listening
to the proceedings. What the media and the public lose in transparency
224 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (holding that, if the government makes an
adequate showing of necessity, protecting a child witness from the trauma of testifying in a childabuse case is an important enough interest to justify the use of a one-way, closed-circuit video
feed); see also, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Carrier, 9 F.3d 867 (10th
Cir. 1993).
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and information, the jury and the defendant would gain in detail and due
process. Because the risks to the government from disclosure would not
be as great, the balance under § 6 would thus tilt in favor of allowing
the defendant to use the information at trial.
Closing part of a trial is not so different from using a "silent
witness," a practice judicially approved in certain, but not all, CIPA
cases. 225 Under silent witness practice, the gallery stays open and the
parties speak in code, referring to Country A and B or Person X and
Y.226 In these circumstances, what usually makes the information
classified is the particular connection, not the general fact a country or a
person is involved. The judge, jury, and defense team are given a key
that matches Countries A or B to, say, France or North Korea, and
Persons X or Y to Mr. Jones and Ms. Smith. The transcript for the
proceedings, which only refers to the code letters from the written key,
is not classified. The classified information is thus shared with judge,
jury, and the defense, but not with anyone else in the courtroom. 227 To
the foreign intelligence officer in the gallery, it is as if that part of the
proceeding is taking place in an unknown language. Just so, CIPA can
be adjusted to acknowledge and to approve silent witnesses in special
cases.
Another way to protect the intelligence officer is the use of
disguises. In the Jose Padilla trial in Miami, the court allowed one CIA
officer to testify in the disguise of glasses and a beard. 228 Testimony
from this officer, who worked at a covert site in Afghanistan, was
necessary for the government to establish the chain of custody for a
225 See, e.g., United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1987) (generally describing
the "silent witness rule," which was not objected to by defense counsel during trial). But see
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008) (expressing no opinion as to the
constitutionality of the silent witness rule as described in Zetti but holding that allowing the jury
to see classified information that has been withheld from the defendant violates the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 710 (E.D. Va.
2007) (prohibiting use of the silent witness rule because, "given the strong presumption .. . that
trials will be open and that evidence will be fully aired in public, CIPA's silence about whether
'substitutions' and 'excisions' can be made available to the public and jury on different terms
should be interpreted as a prohibition on doing so").
226 See Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 708 n.5. The Rosen court noted:
It appears the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Zettl coined the term "silent witness
rule" and described it as follows: "[Ulnder such a rule, the witness would not disclose
the information from the classified document in open court. Instead, the witness,
would have a copy of the classified document before him.... [He] would refer to
specific places in the document in response to questioning. The jury would then refer
to the particular part of the document as the witness answered."
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
227 A foreign intelligence officer who happens to be in the gallery would not be privy to the
connections during direct and cross-examinations.
228 ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL SECURITY CASE STUDIES:
SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 116 (2010), available at www.fjc.gov/public/

pdf.nsf/lookup/tsl00222.pdf/$file/ts100222.pdf, Abby Goodnough, C.I.A. Officer Testifies He
Was Given Qaeda 'PledgeForm 'Said to Be Padilla's,N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at Al3.
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Taliban application form obtained by the officer in Afghanistan with
Padilla's fingerprints on it. A disguise, of course, limits the jury's full
assessment of the witness's demeanor, compromising a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. Nonetheless, the
disguised witness is on occasion a fair balance between the interests of
national security and the interests of a fair trial. On balance, the use of
disguises is another possible area for codification under CIPA.
In other variations, courts have sometimes allowed intelligence
officers to testify under pseudonyms and have considered allowing
officers to testify behind screens. 229 If the defendant and the defense
counsel do not know an officer's true name or identity, they are limited
in how much information they can prepare for cross-examination at
trial, again raising Sixth Amendment concerns. Those concerns,
however, can reasonably be addressed in CIPA practice.
B.

The Constitution and Closed Trials

Whether portions of a trial are closed, the silent witness practice is
adopted, or witnesses are allowed to testify in disguises, pseudonyms, or
behind screens, the government must continue to comply with the
Constitution. The constitutional requirements for closing a trial can be
met, though. Further, just as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
give defendants more rights than the Constitution requires, Congress, as
a matter of public policy, can make the test for trial closure stricter than
the Constitution requires.
Both the First and Sixth Amendments, as starting points, limit the
possibility of closing trials. The First Amendment protects public
access-especially the press's-to court proceedings that have
"presumptively been a public process." 230 Likewise, "the explicit Sixth
Amendment right of the accused [to a public trial] is no less protective
of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and
public." 231
The First and Sixth Amendments, however, are not absolute. As to
the First Amendment's protection of open trials, Press-EnterpriseCo. v.
Superior Court232 is the seminal case. In Press-Enterprise,the trial
229 Id. In the Padilla trial, the disguised CIA officer also testified under a pseudonym. Id. But
in the trial of Ahmed Ressam, the so-called Millennium Bomber intent on blowing up the Los
Angeles airport but arrested off the ferry in Port Angeles, Washington, the judge denied the
government's request to allow one witness to testify from a remote location or behind a screen.
The government, not willing to expose a source to the public, made do without this witness-and
still obtained a conviction. REAGAN, supra note 228, at 49.
230 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984).
231 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
232 464 U.S. 501.
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court had closed voir dire to the public. 233 Press Enterprise moved to
open the proceedings, and the prosecutor objected. 234 The trial court
agreed with the prosecution, closing voir dire and refusing to release
voir dire transcripts to Press Enterprise. 235 After trial, the case reached
the Supreme Court. There, the Court held that the closure was
unconstitutional. 236 As the Court formulated the First Amendment's
protections:
[A] presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough
that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered.237

Yet Press-Enterprise did not address the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a public trial. (It is not clear that the same standard should
apply to both Amendments.) A defendant's right to a public trial is,
after all, connected to a right to a fair trial. And the right to a fair trial
should trump the press's First Amendment right to access when, for
example, a defendant seeks closure to ensure candid answers from the
venire. 23 8
The Court offered more guidance about secrecy and trials in
Waller v. Georgia.239 In that case, the Court applied the PressEnterprise standard when the defendant objected to closure of a
suppression hearing. 240 The Court pointed out:
The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;
that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep
his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions. 24 1
The Court restated Press-Enterpriseas a four-part test: First, the
party seeking closure "must advance an overriding interest that is likely
to be prejudiced, [second,] the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest, [third,] the trial court must consider

233
234
235
236
237

Id. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
Id.
Id.at510-ll.
Id. at 510.

238 This was the exact issue raised during the first jury trial of an alleged international terrorist
arrested after 9/11. United States v. Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d 424 (2003) (holding that the
press's First Amendment right of access yielded to the defendants' right to a fair trial and an
impartial jury).
239 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
240 Id. at 47.

241 Id. at 46 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [fourth,] it must
make findings adequate to support the closure." 242
Although the Supreme Court has not yet applied Waller to the
evidentiary portion of a trial, the lower courts have. 243 Further, in a
case after 9/11, the court in the Northern District of Illinois closed
portions of a hearing for members of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA)
who came out from the secret world in United States v. Abu Marzook.244
The American charges against defendant Salah included providing
material support to Hamas. 245 The American prosecutors, to prove their
case, sought to introduce statements Salah had made while in ISA
custody. 246 Before trial, Salah moved to suppress those statements,
claiming they were the fruits of Israeli coercion and torture. 247 To
support their argument that Salah's statements were voluntary, the
prosecutors proposed the testimony of the two ISA agents at a
suppression hearing. 248 Moreover, to protect the ISA identities and any
sensitive information that might be disclosed, the prosecutors asked the
court to close the hearing while the two ISA agents testified. 249 The
press intervened, challenging the motion for closure. 250
The district court analyzed the Abu Marzook proposal for closure
under both the First and Sixth Amendments. In addressing Waller's
overriding interest prong, the court stressed the government's interest in
keeping classified information from being disclosed. 25 1 The court said
closure would protect the secrecy of intelligence methods and would
preserve our nation's working relationship with a foreign intelligence
service. 252 Protecting the identities of the ISA agents was an overriding
interest because they, like undercover drug agents, would be put in
danger if their identities were revealed. 253 As a result of this analysis,
the court held that Waller was satisfied because the hearing would be
closed only during the ISA agents' testimony. 254 For the suppression

242 Id. at 48.

243 See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1997).
244 412 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 (N.D. 1Il. 2006).
245 Id. at 916.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.

250 Id. at 917.
251 Id. at 926.
252 Id
253 Id.

254 Id. at 925-27.

Salah did go to trial in January 2007. Libby Sander, 2 Men Cleared of

Charges ofAiding Hamas Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2007, at A16. The ISA agents testified

again under pseudonyms while the public was directed to another courtroom where they could
watch the proceedings through an audio and video feed, but could not see the agents themselves.
Since family members of the defendant were allowed to attend the closed proceeding at trial, the
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hearing, the ISA agents entered the courthouse by a private entrance and
were identified in court documents by pseudonyms. But the judge,
having agreed to a closed hearing, did not accept the government's
request that the ISA agents be able to testify in disguise.
Other precedents support closure. Outside the federal system, New
York State has developed procedures for determining if and to what
degree a trial may be closed. On habeas review, the Second Circuit has
accepted the constitutionality of New York's trial closures on several
occasions. 255 New York convenes Hinton hearings to establish whether
closure is appropriate. 256 The procedure is most often employed to
protect the identity of undercover agents in narcotics cases. On this
point, the federal courts might learn from their state court cousins.
Whatever the setting, intelligence officers deserve to be protected as
much as informants.
While statutory language is not yet in place for federal courts to
close portions of terrorism cases, at least one court has already closed
proceedings in an espionage case. In United States v. Pelton,257 the
defendant was charged with delivering highly classified information to
the Soviet Union. 258 The government, for its case in chief, wanted to
play classified recordings of wiretaps. 259 To avoid unnecessary
disclosure of classified information, the government sought to play the
recordings through headphones to only the jurors, the defense, and the
judge. 260 The press intervened, asking the court to reject the
government's plan in light of the press's right of access. 26 1 In this case,
the court recognized that national security was an overriding interest. 262
On this variation of silent witness practice, the government's plan
passed constitutional muster.
Although courts have already closed portions of trials on their own,
Congress should provide courts with specific procedures to decide
whether and how to close trials when CIPA is involved. The solution to
secrecy and due process should be systematic, not ad hoc. To provide a
margin of comfort, Congress might allow closure only when the
government shows by "clear and convincing" evidence that the
overriding interest will "most likely" be prejudiced, rather than the
constitutional standard of "likely to be prejudiced." Congress, in any
judge would have allowed the agents to testify in disguises, something the agents concluded was
not necessary in the end. See REAGAN, supra note 228, at 170-71.
255 See, e.g., Glaude v. Artuz, No. 98-2869, 1999 WL 568033, at *1 (2d Cir. July 20, 1999);
Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1997).
256 People v. Hinton, 286 N.E.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. 1972).
257 696 F. Supp. 156 (D. Md. 1986).
258 Id. at 156.
259 Id
260 Id

261 Id. at 157.
262 Id. at 158.
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event, should include an escape clause that would preclude closure if
the trial court found it would be unconstitutional under the specific
circumstances.
Congress might also delineate a § 6 style hearing to determine
whether and to what degree closure is appropriate. For that hearing,
Congress should lay out a nonexhaustive list of questions to be
answered. Does disclosure affect relations with a foreign intelligence
service? Would disclosure endanger undercover agents or human
assets? As a further check, the Attorney General's authorization might
be required. Whatever the checks, by a clearer and more reasonable
framework for closing portions of trials, Congress can alleviate some of
the complications of trying terrorists in civilian courts while, for the
most part, safeguarding the Constitution's guarantee of a public and fair
trial.
On closed trials and other areas related to CIPA, the time has come
for compromises-and for radical centrism. Long before 9/11, even the
staunchest advocates for transparency conceded that national security
sometimes tilts the balance in favor of closing trials. 263 Since some
federal courts have already engaged in selective closure, Congress
should now address the issue and provide all courts with uniform
guidance. Under a proper separation of powers, Congress, not the
courts, should fill in the details on closing parts of some trials to
accommodate the protection of classified information with the
preservation of fair trials after 9/11.
CONCLUSION

The intelligence community and the law enforcement sector are
supposed to be working closely to keep us all safe from terrorists and
other dangers. The benefits of this cooperation should not be frittered
away by unnecessary burdens in trying suspected terrorists in civilian
courts. If the executive branch is to be kept away from the dark side of
counterterrorism, the courts, Congress, or a combination of the two
should modernize their approach to alignment to § 6 of CIPA and to
closed portions of trials.
First, a prosecutor's discovery obligations should apply to the
intelligence community only when it has most actively participated in
the investigation. When defining "most actively" and in determining
who falls within the prosecution unit, all three branches should err

263 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.24 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that national security may be an example of an overriding interest possibly
justifying closure).
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toward non-alignment, ending the creep toward conceding alignment on
all cases.
Second, the courts, Congress, or a combination of the two should
allow the sensitivity of classified information to affect its use at trial. 26 4
On a close call, the court should be less inclined to admit top-secret
information than information at a lower level of classification. Further,
the more sensitive the information, the more leeway courts should give
prosecutors in proposing substitutions and summaries. The common
sense that probably fills the gaps of CIPA practice, squeezing around
cases and the statute, should be formalized by an update of CIPA.
Third, the courts, Congress, or a combination of the two should
allow small portions of trials that involve classified information to be
closed to the public. Closed portions of trials are part of the logical and
practical extension of silent witness practice. These limited closures
allow courts, as a compensating benefit, to lean toward defendants on
§ 6 decisions as to the use of classified information at trial. By this
compensation, the either/or of full disclosure versus complete
suppression is traded for a range of options. Indeed, those who do not
believe the government should get everything it seeks could argue, as a
trade-off, that Congress should actually codify the straight relevance
approach for § 6 that goes against the government. So if my approach
wins on alignment and on closing portions of trials, the Smith approach
from the Fourth Circuit could be sacrificed. For most ventures, two out
of three is not bad.
CIPA is showing its age. Even so, because its foundation is solid,
it does not require a tear-down as much as a remodeling. In at least
three areas-alignment, § 6, and closed portions of trials-our nation
deserves a better resolution between the conflicting interests of
prosecutors and spymasters.

264 "Sensitivity" is another way of describing the potential damage if the information is
disclosed to the public. Depending on the potential damage, information can be top secret, secret,
or confidential.
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